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HEGEL, HUSSERL, AND REASON TODAY

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This article reproduces the substance of a lecture
delivered at Duquesne University in May, 1958.
Gratitude is here expressed to Dr. Alden Fisher,
of Saint Louis University,
who revised the English version of this article,
which was originally written in French.

I. THE PROBLEM OF PHILOSOPHICAL REASON AND THE CRISIS OF REASON

Philosophy, the work of reason, must be, at the same time, an ever-reviewed inquiry into the possibility of reason and the destiny of reason. What characterizes it, indeed, is its radicality: the ideal to which it corresponds consists in a knowledge which has become perfectly critical; that is, which is capable of justifying itself completely. Therefore reason, which is at work in philosophy, not only provides the justification of this or that particular knowledge but also the justification of itself. This means that philosophy, inasmuch as it is a knowing which aims at radicality, must call itself into question and give to itself its own justification as radical knowing. Thus it is always and at the same time both a using of reason in an endeavor to understand experience and reality rationally and in a radical manner, and a calling into question of reason in an effort to understand this attempt itself, to found its possibility and justify its validity.

But this calling into question of reason which occurs in philosophy cannot be made once and for all. On the contrary it must be undertaken again and again, and each historical epoch undertakes it after its own manner, according to its proper cultural horizon. In our

epoch, the problem of reason must necessarily be posed in the context of a culture which is profoundly marked by the development and success of positive science. We must wonder whether, in such a universe, there is still a place for a philosophy, whether science is not today the only possible expression of the ideal of rationality, whether it has not taken over for its own purposes, and according to its own methods, all that was actually rational in traditional philosophy.

We have seen the manifestation in contemporary culture of two apparently contradictory trends: on the one hand, a trend which has exalted reason under the exclusive form of scientific reason; on the other hand, a trend which has rejected reason in the name of the unconscious, of instinct, of intuition, of life, of bare existence, of fate. In reality, these two trends, far from being contradictorily opposed, are complementary to each other. If science is made the only field of activity for reason, if the scientific method is identified with rationality, everything which does not depend upon this method becomes necessarily irrelevant for reason. And then it will be easy to divide human existence into two parts: on one side will be all that can be analyzed and explained with the aid of scientific method; on the other, all that is out of reach of this method. But where scientific method is no longer valid, there are no longer any criteria; there is no longer any possibility for a universal agreement; there is no longer any truth; there are no longer any rules which can be justified; there remains only unconditional affirmation, the free play of forces which give vent to themselves by their own virtue, without control or justification. Irrationalism is the necessary consequence of positivism. In such a context, moreover, irrationalism comes in the end to dominate the sphere of science itself. Because a science which claims to exhaust the possibilities of reason renders itself incapable of founding itself; and, in particular, it is unable to justify this very claim in the name of which it sets itself up as the absolute expression of reason. Thus, paradoxically, it becomes devoid of justification, of foundation, and is itself established on the ground of unreason. And so appears the danger of a general darkening of reason, of meaning, and of truth; that is to say, the danger of nihilism. This is what may be called the crisis of reason.

From the point of view of this crisis of reason, the philosophy of Hegel might appear as the last great philosophy, as the last effort to

build a rational knowing which would be really radical and able to illuminate its own foundations. And, as is known, this philosophy was precisely characterized by its all-embracing pretension. With Hegel we have an endeavor to recuperate in the discourse of reason the totality of reality and of experience. This is what is expressed in the famous principle (which appears in the preface of Hegel's *Principles of the Philosophy of Law*), "Everything which is real is rational, and everything which is rational is real." If the philosophy of Hegel actually was the last one, it was so under the form of an accomplishment of the philosophical project; and Hegel very likely thought of it in such a manner. But we also find in Hegel's philosophy certain ideas which allowed for a renewal, on other grounds, of the effort of philosophical rationality and which made possible an overcoming of the crisis of reason in the form of a broadening of rationalism and the establishing of a new rationalism, fully adapted to the characteristics of the culture of our age and particularly to the situation created by the domination of positive science. It is in the work of Husserl, it would seem, that the construction of this new rationalism begins, a new rationalism which, to tell the truth, is simply the continuation of the philosophical tradition in its most authentic aspects. In what follows we should like to show what has been the meaning of Husserl's philosophy from the point of view of the crisis of reason and its overcoming and what appears to be the destiny of reason in Western philosophy after Husserl.

II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF HEGEL AS LAST PHILOSOPHY

Hegel announced in his philosophy the end of history; he regarded his own philosophy as the thinking of the end of history and thus as the last philosophy. For him, indeed, philosophy is the translation into discourse of what manifests itself in experience. In a certain sense, there is thus dependence of philosophy upon experience—"in a certain sense" only because a moment must come when philosophy and experience rejoin each other perfectly; at that point dependence is completely out of consideration. Experience, however, does not give all its content immediately. In the interior of itself it admits of a movement, a movement which is not simply a purely external

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concatenation of moments but is the progressive revelation of the spirit to itself and thus of the total reality (because, for Hegel, the total reality, or the absolute, is Spirit). The movement which inhabits experience is therefore the very same movement which inhabits philosophy. If there is movement in experience, it is because experience after all is nothing other than the very life of the Absolute Spirit; and its different moments are nothing other than the different moments of the return of the Absolute Spirit toward itself, or, in other words, of the reflection by which the Absolute Spirit makes itself

¹"This dialectical movement which consciousness executes on itself—on its knowledge as well as on its object—in the sense that out of it the new and true object arises, is precisely what is termed 'experience'" (*Phenomenology of Mind*, trans. J. B. Baillie [2nd ed. New York: Macmillan Co., 1931], introd.). [Passages quoted from Hegel in the author's original text were taken from the French translation of *Die Phaenomenologie des Geistes* by Jean Hyppolite (Paris: Aubier, 1939). For this version the texts from Hegel are from the English translation by Baillie. However, when understanding of the author's interpretation is hampered by the Baillie translation, the latter has been modified to bring it more into line with the French translation—ERROR.]

This text indicates clearly that if there is movement it is because reality is, after all, spirit, or consciousness. When consciousness finds itself in front of an object it tends toward this object in itself and at the same time it has a knowledge of this object. But the two moments do not correspond to each other. Consciousness modifies its knowing in order to make it adequate to the object. But this modification of the knowing modifies the object itself, because it belonged essentially to this knowing. This movement leads finally to an adequation: this is absolute knowing. At this moment, the knowing becomes adequate to the object and discovers that this object is nothing other than itself, in the articulated totality of its constitutive moments. It is only with respect to the ultimate step of absolute knowing that the dialectic takes on all its meaning.

²"In pressing forward to its true form of existence, consciousness will come to a point at which it liberates itself from appearance, the appearance of being hampered with what is foreign to it, with what is only for it and exists as another; it will reach a position where appearance becomes identified with essence, where, in consequence, the presentation of experience coincides with the authentic science of the spirit. And, finally, when it grasps this its own essence, it will connote the nature of absolute knowledge itself" (*ibid.*, p. 145).

The ultimate term of the movement is therefore indeed a point where science and experience rejoin each other; science, that is to say here, philosophy—discovers that it was immanent to experience; and experience shows itself as being nothing other than the very content of knowing as absolute knowing—that is, as absolute Spirit. Consciousness discovers fully what it is; it reaches its true being. And what manifests itself to consciousness no longer manifests itself according to appearance as something external, but indeed as a constitutive moment of consciousness itself (inasmuch as fully revealed to itself in absolute knowing). We are therefore beyond the phenomenon, the pure appearing; we have rejoined the essence, the intimate nature of both consciousness and reality, by discovering that reality and consciousness become identical with each other in the absolute Spirit. Since this moment of coincidence involves the reflexive grasp of itself, it has the nature of a knowing, a knowing of the total reality and a knowing of oneself: this is the absolute knowing.

present to itself, thus constituting itself. Philosophy for its part is only the expression of this reflection in an articulated discourse.

What Hegel calls the dialectic is precisely this movement which runs through experience.¹ And the term of this movement is the full constitution of the absolute knowing, the moment when experience has totally unfolded itself and becomes aware of itself in the totality of its unfolding; or, in other words, the moment when interior and exterior, consciousness and its object, come into coincidence in the fully accomplished reflection which, by understanding itself perfectly, understands that reality is nothing other than the very movement of reflection; that is to say, Spirit.²

History is only the external translation in time of the becoming which is immanent to experience. It represents under the form of the succession of different epochs what logic shows to us under the form of the generating of concepts. And this, not after the manner of an image or of a projection. It is the same movement which animates logic and history, because the concept is time or, inversely, because time is nothing other than the becoming which is immanent to the concept. If philosophy is a seizing in discourse of what experience makes visible, philosophy can only say of the real what experience—the experience which shows itself in history—has already made apparent. Each philosopher says what already accomplished history has brought to maturity at the moment when he expresses himself.

However, a moment comes—and Hegel believes himself to be at this moment—when we enter into the end of history; that is to say, when all the content of reality has fully manifested itself, or, in other words, when the phenomenon has entirely passed into the essence. The “end of history” is therefore not an end in the sense of a term beyond which there would be nothing more; it is an end in the sense of a completed maturation, of a manifestation which has become plenary. There is “end of history” at the moment when the becoming of reality has made fully apparent the essential content of reality; that is to say, its intelligible structure, its rational stuff. Men will evidently be able to continue living after the “end of history” as before, but it will no longer be in exactly the same manner. It will be in a life fully penetrated by the rational and apt to understand itself adequately in its rational nature. But the concrete form under which this end of

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history must present itself can only be philosophy. For if this end is the full manifestation of the essence of reality, it can only be a manifestation in which reality reveals itself for what it is; that is to say, as spirit. And this grasping of reality itself as spirit is the reflection which recuperates all the moments of the becoming as its proper constituent moments. This reflection expresses the full manifestation of the essence of reality in the absolute discourse which is philosophy.

The sign by which we can recognize that we are at the end of history cannot, therefore, be an external sign, like an event or a historical situation; such a sign can be found only in philosophy. What warns us that we are at the end of history is that we have become able to think a philosophy in which reason or spirit expresses itself completely. For this would not be possible—reflection being only able to follow real becoming—if reason had not already made itself fully manifest in historical reality. What allows us to see that reason expresses itself completely in our philosophy is that this philosophy takes on the character of a total reflection. It not only unfolds a system of categories, but it shows that this system is complete because it arrives precisely at Spirit as infinite reflection of itself in itself, at Spirit which retakes everything into itself and which consequently retakes itself (inasmuch as supreme moment of the dialectic) into itself (inasmuch as absolute reflection).³ If Hegel believed himself able to announce the end of history, it is precisely because he had elaborated a philosophy of absolute reflection. This philosophy, at the same time manifestation and thought of the end of history, could only be for him the last philosophy. From the moment when the content of reality has fully revealed itself as the totality of the figures of the manifestation of the Spirit, and when the content of the Spirit has fully manifested itself in the discourse of philosophy, the task of reflection

³"The goal, however, is fixed for knowledge just as necessarily as the succession in the process. The terminus is at that point where knowledge is no longer compelled to go beyond itself, where it finds its own self, and the concept corresponds with the object and the object with the concept" (*ibid.*, pp. 137-38).

Inasmuch as it is a progression, the knowing which expresses itself in

philosophy tends towards a term which is its end. And this term corresponds to the moment of the total reflection of knowing in itself, to the moment where knowing recovers itself fully. In this reflection, the object and the concept rejoin each other, consciousness and reality become identical with each other, interior and exterior come into coincidence with one another.

is fulfilled. There remains nothing to do henceforth but to live in the comprehensive possession of totally accomplished truth.

If Hegelian philosophy appeared to its creator as the last philosophy, it was both in the sense of a recapitulation and in the sense of an accomplishment—recapitulation because, being the expression of the absolute reflection, it had necessarily to retake into itself all the successive moments of the reflection, such as they had expressed themselves in the different philosophies of history; and accomplishment, because, retaking all the philosophies of the past in the perspective of the absolute reflection, it made apparent their real meaning and showed their truth. The truth of each one of those anterior philosophies was precisely to be a moment in the constituting of the absolute reflection and therefore a moment in the constituting of this ultimate philosophy, in which this absolute reflection came to its own expression.

III. THE END OF PHILOSOPHY AND THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A RENEWAL OF REASON

The manner in which Hegel considered his own philosophy might seem to be only a vain intellectualistic pretension. Reality mocks the systems; history gives rise to ever new situations and meanings; reason has not finished exploring its own domain. And yet, when we look at Hegelian philosophy from the crisis-situation which has marked reason in the contemporary epoch, we are strongly tempted to think that this philosophy really was the last one and that it was the last in the sense of revealing the failure of philosophy. Its too perfect success makes its truth doubtful. And through it, the entire philosophical undertaking becomes subject to question. The Tarpeian rock is near the Capitol! The moment of what is apparently the greatest triumph is also the moment of ruin. It could be that Hegelian philosophy has been like the last glittering of philosophical reason and that, with it, the inanity of philosophical understanding has appeared in a definitive light.

In a certain sense, we can say that now the time of the philosophers is over. It is over now because we are returning to the most ancient times, to the time of the poets, the heroes, the demons but also the time of men without name, without face, without word, to the anonymous men of the technological societies—the engineers, the

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physicists, the economists, the men of the atom and of the rockets, the psychoanalysts, the mathematicians, the statisticians, and the strategists with all their pomps and works, voiceless phantoms of a world become desert, a world from which meaning has withdrawn, from which—as Hölderlin says—the gods have fled; a world of scrap-iron and nightmare reigns over the shapeless universality of pure absence.

But the crisis of reason in which we are can also mean a new birth of reason. Perhaps the strength of Logos is not at all exhausted by the trials of the present times. Perhaps, as Hegel thought, the patience and the suffering of the negative are needed in order that Logos reveal itself better to itself.⁴ Perhaps meaning is born only in the apparent destruction of meaning. Perhaps positivity is enveloped in negativity and intimately mixed with it.

It is precisely the greatness of Hegel to have given elements in his philosophy which enable us to go beyond his philosophy. There was, in Hegel, the extraordinary ambition to give to the rationalist ideal its most achieved expression under the form of a total discourse. And

⁴"Spirit only conquers its truth when it finds itself utterly torn asunder . . . spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and dwelling with it" (*ibid.*, p. 93).

For Hegel, the moment of opposition, of negation, is intrinsic to spirit itself; and spirit can recover itself only by going through this moment and by recognizing it as intrinsic to itself.

⁵"It is not surprising that we already find in *Descartes* the idea of a universal mathematics. . . . From then on the world and philosophy acquire correlatively an entirely new face. The world must be in itself a rational world, in the new sense of rationality, which has been borrowed from mathematics and from mathematized nature and, correspondingly, philosophy, the universal science of the world, must be constructed as a unitary rational theory 'more geometrico'" (*Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie*. Husserliana, Band VI [The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff], p. 62).

⁶"In geometrical and physical mathematization, we adapt to the lived world—to the world which is continuously

given to us as real in our concrete everyday life, in the open infinity of possible experiences—an adequate *dress of ideas*, the one of the so-called objective scientific truths; in other terms, according to a method which must be followed (according to what we hope from it) really and to details and which maintains itself in a stable manner; we first construct determined numerical indices for the real and possible sensible qualities of the intuitive concrete objects of the lived world; thereby we become capable of foreseeing the concrete events of the world which are not yet or which are no longer given in a real manner and which nevertheless belong to the intuition of the lived world; this kind of prevision infinitely surpasses the prevision of everyday life" (*ibid.*, p. 51).

It is by analyzing the modern conception of physics, as it has been elaborated in the Galilean physics, that Husserl arrives at this conception of science as an ideal substitute for the lived world. The mathematization of nature realized by modern physics has precisely the significance of substituting ideal forms for intuitive data.

this seems to us to be excessive. But there was also a sort of heroic intrepidity about a philosophy in which thought determines to remain faithful to itself through every trial and to save, notwithstanding every obstacle, the ideal of an apodictic and fully self-conscious knowledge. There was also the recognition of the link which exists between explicit reason and what is not yet reason. Nature is not the absolute contrary of Logos. Nature already envelops rationality in itself, and the internal movement of the life of the Absolute Spirit is the revelation of this hidden rationality. But those two ideas can receive an interpretation which is very different from the one they receive in the general context of the Hegelian system.

IV. HUSSERL AND THE RETURN TO THE "LEBENSWELT" AS A KEY FOR A NEW CONCEPTION OF REASON

In this century a philosopher has appeared who has tried, along different ways, to give a new philosophical expression to those two ideas: Edmund Husserl. In the work of Husserl we find an imposing and heroic endeavor to reconquer in its purity and its truth the old idea of Logos and to save reason from the crisis which threatened it. For Husserl, this crisis concerns not reason itself, but rationalism; that is, the narrow conception of reason which was born from a bad interpretation of the meaning of science.

Physico-mathematical science describes the world for us by means of an apparatus of ideal representations which enables us to obtain a precise and rigorous knowledge, a knowledge which, in its turn, enables us to make predictions which experience comes to confirm. As a result, physico-mathematical science has been interpreted as describing the objective world and has been taken as a model for every valid knowledge of reality. Rationalism, the bad rationalism which is responsible for the crisis of reason, is the philosophical conception which pretends to make of scientific knowledge, in the sense of physico-mathematical science, the pre-eminent archetype and the paradigm of all rational knowing.⁵

But we must notice in meditating upon the conditions of science itself and upon the origins of the contemporary crisis of reason, that science describes to us only a constructed universe which is not the true world, which is an ideal world substituted for the true world.⁶

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Science presupposes necessarily an experience which is prescientific and ante-predicative, and in which the real world is given to us. It is this experience, the experience of the lived world, of the *Lebenswelt*, which is really the root of science, as well as of every form of rational activity.⁷ Science describes to us as being the "real world" a world which is made of idealized particles, of fields, of vibrations; and it "explains" everything which we perceive, the whole universe of sensible qualities, by means of purely quantitative modifications which find their expression in mathematical models. But there is an experience in which we really perceive tones, colors, odors, flavors; in which we really feel the cold and the warm, the dry and the wet, the hard and the soft, the heavy and the light.⁸ And it is this experience which is the absolute ground of every experience, of every truth and all meaning.

Philosophy itself, being a reflection upon experience in general and in its totality, must try to describe and to understand the *Lebenswelt*; and it is with this aim in mind that Husserl proposed his famous transcendental reduction, his famous placing in parentheses, his *epochè*, or suspension. This reduction must enable us to return to the pure subject of the natural experience of the *Lebenswelt* and to see how this experience constitutes itself for us.⁹ From there, philosophy will have

⁷The so-called evidences of science are not primary. Science itself implies certain presuppositions. Science is essentially idealization. It aims at the world which is given in experience through ideal forms. By analyzing the meaning of those ideal forms, it is possible to recover what is aimed at through them; we are then in the presence of what is already there prior to science, of what must necessarily be already there in order that science be possible—the lived world. It is in this world that all the evidences are finally founded. The evidences of science are therefore not primary; they are derived; they are relative to the primitive evidences of the lived world.

"Coming back rapidly to our preceding considerations, let us recall the fact which has been made conspicuous, namely that science is a product of the human mind which, as well in its historical becoming as for every one of those who study it, presupposes, as a

starting point, the surrounding lived world *Lebensumwelt*, given in advance in intuition as being the common world and as the common world—but which presupposes also continuously, in its unfolding and its progression, this same surrounding world, after the manner in which it gives itself again and again to the scientists" (*ibid.*, p. 123).

The lived world "is given in advance to us all, as persons living within the horizon of the human community and therefore in every actual relation which we have with the others, as 'the world', the world common to all. And thus, as we have explained in detail, it is the permanent foundation of every validity, an ever ready source of evidences to which we make appeal quite naturally, be it as practical men or as scientists" (*ibid.*, p. 124).

⁸"What we experience in pre-scientific life as colors, tones, warmth, and weight of things themselves, what we perceive in a causal manner as

to show how the other strata of our total experience and, in particular, scientific experience constitute themselves from the starting point of the *Lebenswelt*.

Thus the idea of reduction is really the key to a new conception of reason. Thanks to it, philosophy once more finds a meaning and a

calorific radiation of a body which warms the surrounding bodies and so on, all of this indicates naturally, 'from the point of view of physics', acoustical vibrations, calorific vibrations, as pure processes of the world of forms" (*ibid.*, p. 35).

And yet, all these scientific constructions presuppose necessarily more fundamental certitudes. "It belongs to the evidences which are at the bottom of all scientific thinking and of all philosophical calling into question, that the world is, is always there, and that every correction of an opinion, of an opinion of experience or of all other opinion, presupposes already the world which is; namely, as an ever unquestionable horizon of being-validity, and, within this horizon, some permanence of something known and certain in an indubitable manner, and with respect to which that which has been deprived of value, possibly as nothingness, is in contradiction" (*ibid.*, pp. 112-13).

*The reflexive return to the lived world, as source of meaning and truth, is evidently completely different from (nonreflexive) life in the lived world. This return implies a rupture with the natural attitude and the establishment of a transcendental attitude: this is precisely the meaning of the *epochè*.

"But how can the pregiven character of the lived world become a proper and universal theme? Manifestly it can become so only in virtue of a *total modification* of the natural attitude, a modification in which we no longer live, as before, as men of natural existence, in the permanent value-accomplishment of the pregiven world. On the contrary, there must be this total modification of the natural attitude in

which we constantly avoid this accomplishment. It is only in this manner that we can reach the new and modified theme, 'the pre-giving of the world as such'—the pure world, quite exclusively, according as it has meaning and being-value and according to the manner in which it has meaning and being-value and in which it acquires meaning and being-value in ever new forms, in the center of our conscious life. It is only in this manner that we can study what the world is as foundational validity of the natural life, in every one of its projects and possessions, and, correlatively, what the natural life and its subjectivity are; ultimately that is, what it is in a pure manner as that subjectivity which operates there as accomplishing the validity. The life which constitutes the mundane validity of the natural, mundane life cannot be studied in the attitude of the natural, mundane life. This study demands therefore a *total reversing*, a universal *epochè* of a quite singular nature" (*ibid.*, p. 151).

The unveiling of the lived world as such is, ipso facto, the unveiling of the subjectivity which operates in the experience of the lived world. This subjectivity is not a substance-subject, it is a pure function, a pure pole. What the *epochè* makes visible is that the fundamental structure of the primitive experience of the lived world is the transcendental correlation of consciousness and the world. In this correlation, consciousness appears as the pure correlate of the world—*ego cogito cogitata*; that is, as transcendental subject. This explains how the *epochè* which unveils the lived world is a transcendental reduction.

Thanks to the *epochè*, says Husserl,

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justification; the transcendental life, discovered and revealed by the *époque*, opens up for thought a boundless field of research and gives philosophy its proper object. And thus the project of philosophical knowledge is taken up again in a radical and definitive manner. It must lead to the establishment of a superior knowing, of a science in the highest sense of the term, really universal and really radical, covering the whole field of experience and supplying itself with its own foundation.¹⁰ Philosophy is indeed the accomplishment of reason; at the same time it is the discovery that the internal meaning of experience is rational, that experience in its totality is reason—and reason's understanding of itself by itself. The reflection upon experience is identically the self-reflection of reason upon itself; because reflection upon experience is possible only through the reduction to the pure subject, the transcendental ego, for whom there is experience (*ego cogito cogitata*). Consequently, reflection upon experience is reflection upon the ego.¹¹ By reflecting upon itself the ego understands itself,

the eyes of the philosopher are liberated from what, in the natural attitude, bind them to the evidence of the world as pregiven. "In and with this deliverance is given the discovery of the universal and absolutely original correlation, closed in itself in an absolute manner, of the world itself and of consciousness of the world. . . . And finally becomes visible what must be seized as the ultimate datum: the absolute correlation of every being, whatever its nature may be, and of every meaning on the one hand and of absolute subjectivity on the other hand, inasmuch as it constitutes all meaning and all being-validity in this ultimate mode" (*ibid.*, p. 154).

The reduction to the lived world leads us therefore to the discovery of the transcendental subject; consequently it is a transcendental reduction. The texts of the *Krisis* thus enable us, inversely, to interpret the reduction to the transcendental Ego which appears in the anterior works from the point of view of the reduction to the lived world.

Thus, in the *Formale und transzendente Logik*, Husserl raised the problem of the ultimate foundation of logic and, through logic, of science in general. He found this foundation in

transcendental subjectivity, conceived as the "intentional pole of experience" and presented as the "only being existing in an absolute manner."

"Every existing being [in contradistinction to the false ideal of a being existing in an absolute manner and having an absolute truth] is finally relative and, along with all that is relative in any current sense, is *relative to the transcendental subjectivity*. But the transcendental subjectivity alone is *in itself and for itself* and this even in a hierarchical order corresponding to the constitution which leads to the different levels of the transcendental intersubjectivity" (*Formal and Transcendental Logic*. After the French trans. of S. Bachelard [Paris, Presses Universitaires de France], p. 362).

Such a text runs the risk of being misinterpreted in an idealistic sense. The texts of the *Krisis* on the lived world are the ones which explain to us the true meaning of the transcendental subject. Moreover, Husserl himself compares the procedure of the *Krisis* with that of the *Ideen* [*Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*]. The way followed in the *Ideen* has the disadvantage, he says, of leading us too quickly to the

understands itself as being capable of understanding itself and as open to an infinite life of the understanding; that is, the ego understands itself as reason. But since the description of the structures of the ego is nothing other than the description of the structures of experience and therefore of the world such as it is given to us, of the world as system of the phenomena, the self-understanding of the ego, which consists in the description of its essential structures, is at the same time discovery of reason in itself by itself and discovery of the rationality of experience and thus of the world as it is given to us.¹²

Ego and of putting us in front of a subjectivity which is apparently void of any content (*Die Krisis*, p. 158). This text of Husserl explicitly authorizes us to connect the reduction to the transcendental Ego which appears in the anterior works with the *épochè* which is analyzed in the *Krisis*.

¹⁰"The reason which is now in question is nothing other than the really universal and the really radical self-understanding of spirit in the form of a universal and responsible science, in which a thoroughly new mode of the scientific ideal is made effective, in which every conceivable question—questions about being and questions about norms, questions about what is called existence—finds its place" (*Die Krisis*, p. 346).

¹¹"*Phenomenology in its entirety is nothing more than the becoming-conscious by itself of the transcendental subjectivity, a scientific becoming-conscious which first operates in an immediate manner, with a certain naïveté, but which then considers in a critical manner its own logos. . . . Every objective being, every truth has its being-foundation and its knowledge-foundation in the transcendental subjectivity; and if the truth in question is a truth which concerns the transcendental subjectivity itself, then it has its foundation precisely in this subjectivity itself*" (*Logic*, pp. 363-64).

Philosophy is a radical endeavor to understand experience in its totality. But experience can only be understood radically by a return to the lived

world; and this return itself can be performed only by an unveiling of the transcendental life, of the primitive transcendental correlation of the Ego and world. The task of philosophy, under the form of transcendental phenomenology, is therefore to make explicit the transcendental life, the life of the transcendental Ego. But to make this life explicit is to make explicit the Ego in all its correlations and in all its transcendental functions. Since the Ego is simply the "intentional pole of experience," to analyze the structures of the Ego is, *ipso facto*, to analyze the transcendental, constitutive structures of experience and thereby to supply experience in its totality with a radical foundation.

¹²The philosophical life, as Husserl understands it, is the life of absolute reason becoming conscious of itself; it is life in the transcendental intersubjectivity (of Ego's inasmuch as transcendental and as transcendentially open to each other); it retakes the non-philosophical life in its truth (life in the natural attitude, scientific life, and so on); it is also a life in which man, by trying to reach the foundations of his experiences and of his being, makes himself fully responsible for himself as reason; it is a life which unfolds itself in the perspective of apodicticity, of a certitude which is really founded and which provides itself with its own foundation; it is a life which, as life in reason, is a blessed life; it is a life, finally, which is open to an infinite task,

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V. HUSSERLIAN CONCEPTION OF REASON, THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION, PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE

This means that we have with Husserl a considerable broadening of the concept of reason. The rational is no longer just what is repre-

which is going towards the *telos* of an absolute science, of the absolute self-apodicticity of reason.

We must cite here the entire last sentence of the *Krisis*, in which Husserl describes the task of philosophy and makes the philosophical life be seen as the vocation and the duty of man as bearer of reason.

"Thus begins a philosophy of the deepest and most universal self-understanding of the philosophizing ego as bearer of absolute reason coming towards itself, of this reason as implying in its apodictic being-for-itself its co-objects and all the possible co-philosophers. Thus begins the discovery of the absolute intersubjectivity (objectivated in the world as the whole of mankind) as the one in which reason is in indefinite progress in darkening, in clearing up, and in the movement of luminous self-understanding; thus begins the discovery of the necessary concrete mode of being of the absolute subjectivity in the final analysis, of the transcendental subjectivity in a transcendental life of continuous "world-constitution" and, at the same time correlatively, the new discovery of the world which is, the meaning of the being of which, as transcendently constituted, gives a new meaning to what, on former levels, was called world, world-truth, and world-knowledge. But this new discovery by the very fact also gives a new meaning to human existence, to the existence of man in the spatio-temporal pregiven world as self-objectivation of the transcendental subjectivity, its being, and its constituting life; thus begins further the ultimate self-understanding of man as responsible for his proper human being, his *self-understanding as being in a being-called to a life in apodicticity*—not only developing an abstract science, apodictic in the ordinary sense

—but a self-understanding which realizes its whole concrete being in an apodictic liberty for an apodictic life, active in everybody, a life of reason, in which this life is humanity. Thus begins, as has been said, a life which understands itself as reasonable, which understands that it is reasonable in a willing to be reasonable, that this means an infinity of life and of striving towards reason, that reason signifies precisely that towards which man as man in his most intimate being strives, that which alone can satisfy him and make him 'blessed'; a life which understands further that reason will tolerate no distinction between 'theoretical,' 'practical,' 'aesthetic,' and so on, that the being of man is a teleological being and a being which is subject to obligation, and that this teleology is present in every activity and project coming from the ego; a life which understands that the apodictic *telos* can be recognized in every action and project through self-understanding, and that this knowledge of final self-understanding has no other form than a self-understanding according to a-priori principles, than a self-understanding in the form of philosophy" (*Die Krisis*, pp. 275-76).

¹³"The world, as lived world, already has in a prescientific way the 'same' structures as those structures which the objective sciences—in accordance with their implicit acceptance (which with the tradition of the centuries has become an evidence) of an underlying world, existing 'in itself' and determined according to 'self-evident truths'—presuppose as aprioristic structures and which they develop systematically in aprioristic sciences, sciences of the Logos, universal methodical norms to which every knowledge of the existing world, 'objective in itself,' must be submitted" (*ibid.*, p. 142).

sentable in a physico-mathematical knowledge, but the rational is coextensive with the self-explicitation of the ego by itself; that is, of experience by itself. It is reason, the rational within experience itself, that makes it open to a limitless self-explicitation. This conception rejoins, then, the first perspective of Hegel—confidence in reason as the essential armature of human existence.

On the other hand, as we see, this broadening of reason shows us that the rational activity of philosophical reflection is only the explicitation of what is contained in the fundamental experience of the *Lebenswelt*. This explains why this experience, although not clear to itself in itself and not explicitated, although opaque to itself, so to speak, is nevertheless inhabited by a meaning; this explains why meaning can be revealed by philosophical reflection. In particular, the type of rationality which is proper to the positive sciences is explained as founded in the structures of the lived world.¹³ Scientific rationality is already traced, as in a mold, in the lived world. For example, geometrical space is already precontained in lived space. In a general way, everything which belongs to the sphere of explicitation and thus of predication is already present in the ante-predicative sphere of the nonexplicitated. Much more, it is not the ego as constituting subjectivity which produces the rationality of experience or even which discovers the immanent rationality of the lived world. It is the lived world itself which produces, so to speak, rational experience, which reveals itself and explicitates itself as revealable and capable of being rendered explicit; that is to say, as rational. And this corresponds to the second perspective of Hegel. Spirit is already present in nature, and alienation is not only an obstacle; it is, on the contrary, the active production of the spirit. The suffering of the negative is the suffering of childbirth. It is not the spirit which, from the height of absolute reflection, discovers nature as one of its moments; it is the internal movement, present in nature itself, which goes beyond the opacity of nature and discovers itself progressively as, first, capable of self-explicitation; then, in the realization of this self-explicitation, as spirit; and, finally, in the adequate and total accomplishment of this self-explicitation, as absolute spirit.

This philosophical perspective shows itself to be capable of integrating the new results of the sciences of man. If the human reality is

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reason, it is not so in the sense of a pure presence to oneself or of a clear and distinct reason. There is a hidden reason in what is called the unconscious; there is a reason of dream and of illness, of customs and of speech. And this reason is the true root of what appears in the explicitated region of meaning. This reason is truly productive. And

¹⁴The *Lebenswelt* is the ultimate foundation whereupon are built the different levels of human experience. No truth would be possible, no value would be accessible, if there were not somewhere a domain of first, fundamental evidence.

What characterizes evidence is that it is a mode of knowledge in which "the thing itself" is given. Perception is the most original form of it. However, "fundamental evidence" does not mean "absolute evidence." When the "thing itself" gives itself to us, it is with the permanent possibility of modification, of correction, of retaking; it gives itself, not in an exhaustive manner, but as the theme of an open experience which can always be renewed and enriched; to put it briefly, it gives itself in an infinite "horizon" of possible experiences.

Husserl had already approached the problem of the *Lebenswelt* in *Formale und transzendente Logik* in form of a critique of evidence.

"Evidence means . . . the intentional accomplishment of the giving of the things themselves. . . . However, we must here indicate immediately that evidence has diverse modes of originality. The primitive mode of giving of the things themselves is perception" (*Logic*, pp. 214-15).

"Experience means here . . . giving of the thing itself, evidence in general . . . it is absolutely obvious to anyone, unless he is lost in philosophy, that the thing perceived in perception is the thing itself in its being-present which is proper to it, and that when perceptions are delusive, this means that they are in conflict with new perceptions which show with certitude what is actually in the place of what was only illusion. What are the other questions which must be raised here? In any case they must be raised with respect to the experiences under consid-

eration; and it is through the intentional analysis of these experiences and in an essential generality that one can understand how an experience in itself can give, as thing seized by it, an existing being itself and how, nevertheless, this existing being can be cancelled; how, by virtue of its very essence, such an experience indicates, in its horizon, other possible experiences which confirm it, but how also, by virtue of its very essence, it leaves open the possibility that other experiences could manifest themselves which would be in conflict with it and which would lead to corrections under the form of determination-modifications or of complete canceling (in the case of an appearance)" (*ibid.*, pp. 272-73).

We find the same theory of perception, characterized by a structure of horizon, in the *Krisis* (pp. 160-61): "If I remain in perception, I already have nevertheless the full awareness of the thing, such as I see it already at first glance as this thing. Looking at it, I 'aim' continuously at it with all its facets, which are not at all given to me, not even under the form of intuitive pre-presentifications. Perception therefore always has, 'according to the mode of consciousness which is proper to it' a horizon which already belongs to its object (to this object which is aimed at in it)."

We have access to truth, but not to a truth in itself which should be given to us somewhere in an exhaustive manner. This results from the very structure of our experience, such as the phenomenological analysis reveals it to us.

"But what have we to think about all the experiences which we have of the world, about what is given to us with certitude in an immediate manner as being spatio-temporal? This is given to us with certainty, but this certitude can be modalized, can become dubious;

this is absolutely essential. For empirical rationalism, consciousness is pure receptivity; there is an outside and an inside; and the inside is the mere reflection, the mere reproduction of the outside. For idealistic rationalism, the opposite is true. Consciousness is pure activity. There are external data; but it is the subject, as supreme synthetic form, which produces the unity of those data and gives them meaning. For contemporary rationalism, for phenomenological rationalism in any case, the subject is neither pure passivity nor pure activity. This is because the subject is complex. As consciousness, that is, as bearer of a system of explicitated meanings, it is immersed in a field which is not consciousness, which is not explicit presence of a meaning or presence to oneself, but which nevertheless is inhabited by meaning and is the producer of meaning. It is therefore non-explicitated experience which bears within itself the destiny of reason and of meaning; and the reflection of reason upon itself must be reflection upon this inchoative and immanent presence of reason in that which is not yet itself but in which reason is nevertheless already present entirely.

VI. THE LIMITS OF THE HUSSERLIAN RATIONALISM, FINITE SUBJECTIVITY AND TELEOLOGY OF REASON

However, if it is true that the Husserlian perspective rejoins in a double manner the Hegelian perspective, there is nevertheless an absolutely fundamental difference between the Hegelian conception and the Husserlian conception of reason. For Hegel, reason is the self-accomplishment of itself under the form of total reflection, expressed in the total system of absolute Knowing. For Husserl, on the contrary, there is nothing which resembles a total reflection. And, moreover, this is a necessary consequence of his conception of the *Lebenswelt* as the absolute ground of experience. For him, the life of reason is not indeed the infinite movement of reflection; it is the self-explicitation of the *Lebenswelt* itself. But the fundamental type of experience belonging to the *Lebenswelt* is perception; and what characterizes perception is that it gives us the thing itself, but in an infinite multiplicity of possible givings.¹⁴ Thus there is indeed presence of the thing in itself—it is not just an appearance or a representation

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which we perceive—but this presence is not, is never, an exhaustive presence. Experience is therefore an ever-open concatenation of presentations.

And this refers us back to the structure of the subject itself, which is temporal, which is, much more, temporalization. The life of the subject is thus the never-ceasing movement of the passage of the future into the past; it is therefore a succession of presences which are constituted by a pure passing. There is therefore no pure and full presence but only presences which are as if corroded from the interior by the fall into the past, which withdraws them from our control and,

it can, in the course of the evolution of experience, dissolve itself into mere illusion. No immediate experience-proposition gives me a being for what it is in itself; experience never gives anything but a term which is aimed at with certitude, a term which must find its confirmation in the becoming of my living experience. But simple confirmation, which lies in the consistency of real experience, does not preserve me from the possibility of illusion" (*Die Krisis*, pp. 269-70).

Therefore we have to do only with relative truths. And yet we are sustained by the idea of absolute truth. Philosophy will be the effort of reason to live according to this idea. From this follows the teleological conception of reason which we find in Husserl.

"How can thought reach something other than relative truths? Yet the man of everyday life is not without reason . . . but has the complete idea, 'truth in itself,' a meaning for him? Is not this idea, and correlatively the idea of being in itself, a philosophical invention? And yet it is not a question here of a fiction, of an invention without significance and which would be dispensable, but of an invention which raises man to a new degree of being, which is called to raise him in a new historicity of human life, whose entelechy is this new idea and the corresponding philosophical and scientific praxis, the methodology of a scientific thinking of a new type" (*ibid.*, pp. 270-71).

¹⁵"The actual Ego performs thus an accomplishment wherein it constitutes as being (under the mode of the past) a form of modification of itself. From this one can understand how the actual Ego, the Ego which is present in a permanent flux, constitutes itself in its self-temporalization as lasting through its past states. In the same way the actual Ego, the already lasting Ego of the primordial sphere of duration, constitutes in itself another as other. The self-temporalization which occurs, so to speak, by depresentification (by reminiscence) has its analogue in the alienation of the Ego (*Einfühlung* as a de-presentification of a higher level—that of the fundamental presence of the Ego in a simply presentified fundamental presence)" (*ibid.*, p. 189).

Husserl establishes here a connection between the problem of temporality and the problem of presence to others. The present is not pure present; it is a present which is temporalizing, which constitutes itself as being at the same time presence and absence (under the form of the past and of the future). Presence to others, implies, analogously, a going out of oneself; it occurs in a fundamental presence (presence of myself to myself) which is open in the interior of itself to another-than-myself. There is moreover not only analogy but fundamental linking between those two problems; it is the fundamental structure of the Ego, such as it manifests itself in temporality, which makes possible openness to others.

¹⁶See, for this, the conclusion of the *Krisis*, cited in n. 12.

by the announcement of the future, introduces into them an inescapable modification. It is for this reason that reflection itself is inexhaustible; it is always open, as is the very experiences which it must explicitate, because it is the reflection of a subject linked with time and consequently not entirely present to itself. The presentification which accomplishes itself in the present is accompanied by the depresentification which is correlative with the past and with the future and which means that we are given to ourselves, that we do not make ourselves; in one word, that we are finite.¹⁵

Under these conditions, reason must be conceived as an infinite task, as a duty, a guiding idea, a horizon. It cannot be conceived as a pure actuality. The life of reason in us is this infinite march towards an absolute apodicticity which we shall never be able to reach but which nevertheless has a meaning and a reality for us, not as a present datum or a finite determination, but as a demand, an inspiration, an appeal—let us dare to say, a vocation.¹⁶

We are concerned, then, with a doctrine of finite subjectivity. This philosophy does not present itself as a metaphysic, if by metaphysic we must understand a doctrine of the absolute. But perhaps the metaphysical question must also be finally encountered in this perspective. If I am open transcendently as a reasonable being to an infinite task, what is the meaning of this openness itself? Must we not consider the openness as openness? But this would lead us toward a very different perspective. We should then have to understand Logos not only as an accomplishment which gives significance to our life—thus in a purely anthropological perspective—but as the reverberation in us of that by virtue of which there is meaning and speech, the reverberation in us of originary truth. We should then be obliged—and this is what we find in the philosophy of Heidegger—to understand the very being of man as openness within the transcendental openness of Being and to see in man, inasmuch as inhabited by a Logos, the shepherd of the Being.

VII. REASON AS AN INFINITE TASK,
LIFE OF THEORETICAL REASON IN THE HORIZON OF TRUTH,
LIFE OF PRACTICAL REASON IN THE HORIZON OF MORALITY

But we shall limit ourselves here to evoking these perspectives in order to come back to our theme on the broadening of reason. What was able to make us doubt for a moment the possibilities of philosophy was, on the one hand, as was indicated above, the place which has been taken by positive science and the interpretations which have been given of this latter under the form of positivism. But it was also, on the other hand, the spectacle of historical becoming, which, far from conforming itself to rational insights, has shown on the contrary all the strength of irrational factors and has led us to reactivate the category of fate. If we want to give back to philosophy its vigor and justify its undertaking, we must meet this double difficulty. We must, on the one hand, show that scientific rationality does not exhaust the domain of reason, that it must be founded in a superior rationality, and that philosophy precisely is able to illuminate what science gives us to perceive without giving us the means to understand it in a really radical manner. And we must, on the other hand, reinterpret historical action in such a manner as to take control, from the point of view of the demands of philosophical understanding, over fate itself. The new philosophical conception of reason enables us, to be sure, to integrate the results of the new sciences of man. But do they enable us to understand the failures of history and the tragedy of historical existence? Yes, if we understand reason as an infinite task. The life according to reason is not only explicitation in discourse; it is also the explicitation of human existence and interhuman relationships according to norms; that is, in conformity with the demands of reason itself. To will oneself as reason is to will the universal advent of reason in all and in each one; it is thus to will not only a universal apodictic knowing but also a universal society of absolute reciprocity.

We cannot actually build this universal science or this universal society. There is something which acts as a screen, so to speak, between our endeavors and our aims. But negativity itself is productive, and there is a subterranean advance of reason in history. What we can do is try to make explicit this advance everywhere where this is

¹⁷See, *Les aventures de la dialectique* (Paris, Gallimard) but chiefly the work which remains so far the fundamental

work of Merleau-Ponty, *La phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris, Gallimard).

possible; the reasonable policy consists in moving in the direction of what matures in history and thus in refusing useless violence as well as sterile opposition. But what counts is what sustains the effort. We cannot dream of a society of universal reconciliation for the day after tomorrow; we cannot even dream of it as something realizable. But we must pursue its realization as an ideal.

There is therefore a horizon of truth, as apodictic absolute science, and a horizon of morality, as society of absolute reciprocity. It is this double horizon which characterizes the life of reason. Thus, according to this perspective, reason is the hope of reason; that is to say, the hope of significance, which is the hope of truth and of morality. It is this hope which gives a present meaning to each of our steps, in the measure that they are inspired by the perspective of the reasonable life—and this is the case, whether it be steps of knowledge, in science or in philosophy, or steps of action, in the historical and political life. To live in this hope is perhaps difficult. The life of reason is a life which is not at all easy, and many prefer to it the simplicity of the immediate life of sensibility, of feeling, or of passion. The life of reason often demands courage and sometimes heroism. But the greatness of human life is at this price.

VIII. THE CONCEPT OF DIALECTICS AND THE CONCEPT OF "KAIROS" AS EXPRESSIONS OF THE NEW CONCEPTION OF REASON

Husserl, to be sure, is not the last word of contemporary philosophy. He has opened up a perspective and has had the merit of giving a new form to the ideal of rationalism, great rationalism, the one of the reasonable life of Logos. But in his language, Husserl has perhaps not always succeeded in adequately expressing his fundamental inspiration. It is not certain, for example, that the philosophy of the transcendental ego is the best expression of this inspiration, and we can even suspect that it is as a screen which dissimulates what is essential in this inspiration. This inspiration is much better represented by the notion of *Lebenswelt*. And we could, with Merleau-Ponty, reintroduce a classical Hegelian concept, the concept of dialectic, in order to express more adequately the real content of this broadened conception of reason.¹⁷

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Consciousness, we have seen, is neither purely receptive nor purely productive. It is neither pure passivity nor pure activity—neither purely submissive to things nor purely constitutive (and the theory of the transcendental ego is full of misunderstandings because it describes the ego as constituting). On the other hand, the world—that is, the content of our experience, what is given—is neither totally opaque nor totally transparent. In our interchange with the world we give and receive, we make and are made. Latent meanings inhabit this world and it is our behavior, the lived movement of our existence, which, by going toward things, reveals this significance and constitutes it as a meaning for us. Our life is, as it were, inscribed in stipple drawing in the middle of things; but on the other hand our action effectively transforms the world by revealing what it contained in itself. The dialectic is this never-ceasing interchange by which we make ourselves in making the world and by which the world makes itself in making us. We have had such or such behavior; the result of this behavior has passed into the things of the world, in the form of words, institutions, social or historical actions. In their turn, those things propose new actions, induce in us certain attitudes and certain types of behavior. But there is always an indetermination in the things. The significance which they carry is a significance which is not yet entirely fixed, so that the same thing is capable of carrying many diverse meanings according to what we are going to do with them. And we ourselves, for our part, are at the same time both undetermined and over-determined. It is only through the encounter with the things of the world that we reveal ourselves to ourselves, that our liberty takes on a concrete shape and our life an effective outline. The body is the locus of this never-ceasing going-over of consciousness into the world and of the world into the consciousness. The body is the place, the *topos* of the dialectic. A philosophy of a broadened reason must be a philosophy of the body, a philosophy of incarnation.

But there is another concept which would enable us perhaps—as Max Müller suggests¹⁸—to say the same thing more profoundly yet: the concept of *kairos*. The *kairos*, for the Greeks, is the favorable moment, this moment, marked by destiny, when our life must accomplish itself. We are not pure liberty and we cannot give to our life an arbitrary content. But on the other hand we are not submitted to a

¹⁸Max Müller, *Crise de la méta- xx^e siècle*. (Paris, Desclée-de Brouwer.)
physique. *Situation de la philosophie au*

blind destiny. What happens is not purely accidental, not simply the fruit of an accidental encounter. What happens is something which happens for us, but we must be able to recognize it and seize what is presented to us. Liberty is placed at the meeting-point of an internal act and of an external situation; something is proposed to us, but we must recognize the situation and assume it. The world makes us and we make the world. We are made and make ourselves. The reason which is in us is also in things. The meaning of our life does not come entirely from a pure reflection or from an internal dream. The significance of our life is suggested to us by the encounters which we have. But those encounters are according to our measure. The generous man encounters great circumstances, and the shabby man encounters circumstances which are devoid of exaltation. Everything is full of significance, but man is the being by which significance must be revealed; liberty is the revelation of meaning. To believe that there is meaning and that it belongs to us only to reveal it, this is the hope of reason. This hope perhaps is a choice but a choice which is itself reasonable. It opens up, in the humility of daily life, an imposing perspective. It is great to search for truth and justice; it is greater to search for them in the name of the hope of their absolute accomplishment.

IX. REASON AND ITS "OTHER," INROOTEDNESS OF REASON
IN THE UNDIFFERENTIATED LIFE, OVERCOMING OF REASON
IN THE SPIRITUAL LIFE

We must, however, after having evoked this perspective of a broadened reason, try to show what is the place of this reason in the whole of human existence. Because, if we can no longer identify the rational and the real, like Hegel, we must still indicate precisely how reason meets its "other," how it nourishes itself upon it, how also it goes beyond itself in this "other." In the reflection which reason has accomplished upon itself in order to overcome the crisis of contemporary nihilism, a way has been opened up and now must be followed. This way led, in Husserl, to the *Lebenswelt*. From there Husserl described a vast program for a reconstruction of a philosophy of reason. But now we have become conscious at the same time both of the strength of reason—Husserl is an admirable example of this—

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and also of its limitations. We know better now that reason is not the first moment or the last of human existence. On the one hand, it comes from something which is more ancient, more primitive, more elementary, also richer, deeper, more extended. And, on the other hand, it is not the ultimate accomplishment of human existence.

Below, or at the side of reason, there is the primitive, undifferentiated life, where everything is precontained but where the original separation has not yet been effectuated between true and false, being and nothingness, knowing and opinion, reasonable and not-reasonable. Now we must come back to this undifferentiated life in order to try to find again the ground from which our tradition has constituted itself—but not in the sense of a sort of irrationalism. It is precisely a question of coming back to a point prior to the opposition of rationalism and irrationalism, of coming back to what is not yet differentiated, because we feel that now the experience of reason has reached its culminating point and that something new is preparing itself. Technological civilization, founded upon physico-mathematical science, has now revealed what was contained in it and will produce nothing more which is essential. Contemporary philosophy is at the same time last and first: last because it is the interpretation of philosophical endeavor in the context of this civilization, and first because it is the remote announcing of another form of experience. What must come cannot yet be said; it must first be lived. And perhaps it is only in the nonexplicit language of painting, music, and poetry that this world will first announce itself. In any case, we must come back to a point before speech in order to be only listening. It is in the silence of the heart that truth grows and matures. This does not mean the destruction of reason (we have already virtually overcome nihilism) but the approach of an internal transformation of reason.

On the other hand, above or beyond reason, there is spiritual experience. This is not yet religious experience. But, of course, if religious experience is possible, it is based upon spiritual experience, not upon the experience of the rational. This experience is already anticipated in the rational discourse of philosophy, and again it is the greatness of Hegel to have tried to integrate this experience into the totality of rational discourse. But what we must retain from the reflection of Husserl is that the experience of reason has its limits and cannot integrate everything. In other words, in human existence there are ruptures and discontinuities. We can evoke spiritual experience.

We cannot transform it into discourse because it is beyond discourse. It is the pure movement of presence or of coexistence, in the sense which Claudel explained of *co-naissance*. It is the discovery of the self as present to the totality and the discovery of the totality as present to the intimacy of the self. Or, again, it is the experience of the open as such; it is the discovery of the coincidence of the finite ego and infinite reality; it is therefore the overcoming of finitude and temporality; it is also the overcoming of the experience of dereliction. It is a life *sub specie aeternitatis*, and it culminates in the experience of joy. Under its practical aspect—because it is not pure contemplation—it is generosity; that is, limitless confidence in others, the world, and being.

Philosophy cannot adequately describe the life of the spirit because it is itself the life of Logos. But it must suggest it, as being its limit from above. In the same way it cannot adequately describe the undifferentiated life, but it must evoke it as being its limit from below. The concrete movement of existence is the articulation of insistence (undifferentiated life) and transcendence under the double form of Logos and of Pneuma. And the concrete movement of discourse, the place of Logos, is the assumption of insistence into speech which is openness for the pure experience of presence.

The destiny of reason is to think itself in this double articulation, as a retaking and as a preparation, as assumption and as an openness, as coming from that in which all existence is rooted, and as going towards that in which existence consummates itself.

Chronicle

TWO NEW QUARTERLIES have appeared on the philosophical scene. The first number of the *Heythrop Journal*, published by the Jesuit Fathers of the Faculties of Philosophy and Theology, Heythrop College, Oxon, England, was issued in January, 1960, and regular issues will follow each quarter in April, July, and October. Subjects treated will include philosophy and theology, scripture exegesis, biblical theology, canon law, ecumenism and Church relations, missiology and pastoral psychology. A current "Quarterly Book List" of English publications will appear at the request, and with the co-operation, of the Association of British Philosophical and Theological Libraries. The other new quarterly review is *World Justice*, devoted to the study of international social justice. The best talent in the world will be mobilized to clarify what is still doubtful in the field of the social sciences. The journal is published by the Louvain University Research Center for International Social Justice.

THE FIFTH INTERNATIONAL THOMISTIC CONGRESS will be held at Rome, from September 13 to 17, 1960, under the sponsorship of the Pontifical Roman Academy of St. Thomas Aquinas. This Congress will deal with moral problems and will treat the following three themes: the foundation and helps of morality, the rights of truth and liberty, and the true concept of labor. The Congress is held at Rome every five years.

SAINT JOHN'S UNIVERSITY continued its Institute in the Philosophy of Science, on February 6, 1960. The Institute includes four special lectures by distinguished scholars. On February 27, Reverend Dr. Gerald B. Phelan, Professor of Philosophy at St. Michael's College, Toronto, discussed "The Two Types of Science concerning Nature." On March 26, April 9, and May 14, respectively, lectures will be delivered by Dr. Charles de Koninck, Professor of Philosophy at Laval Institute, Quebec, on "Experimental Science: A Continuation of Philosophy"; by Dr. Karl F. Herzfeld, Professor of Physics at Catholic University, on "The Structure of the Atom in the Light of Contemporary Physics"; and by Reverend Dr. Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., Professor of the History of Science at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois, on "Does Natural Science Attain Nature or Only the Phenomena?" Dr. Vincent E. Smith is the director of the Institute and course lecturer. The course will be in the philosophy of physics. Dr. Smith, editor of the *New Scholasticism*, formerly taught at Catholic University and the University of Notre Dame. The Philosophy of

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OF THE SOUL

—Continued

II

My suggestion thus far has been that far from ignoring the question of the immortality of the soul, Berkeley's radical elimination of extension was prompted by this very issue. Berkeley, I have suggested, took up his role as a defender of Christian orthodoxy and refuter of skepticism in large part as a result of the unsatisfactory status that the soul's immortality had been left in, particularly by the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy and more generally by the entire Cartesian tradition. That Berkeley was concerned with the preservation of a self which could be a candidate for immortality becomes evident, I think, when one examines (a) his "solutions" to several of the philosophical problems that occur in the third *Dialogue* and (b) his later contributions to philosophy; for example, *Alciphron* and *Siris*. The discussions I have in mind are those involving the questions of identity as well as perceptual error and illusion.

In these "solutions" Berkeley falls back on an inferential theory of perception, often given expression in his use of the language metaphor, which he first advanced in the *New Theory of Vision*. But in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*, Berkeley sought also to refute skepticism; and his refutation was based on his realization that so long as a correspondence between perceptions and realities must be sought, criteria are required, and hence skeptical problems persist. However, what is especially interesting is that in the end Berkeley is willing to turn his back on the common-sense or direct realism of his refutation of skepticism and thereby run the almost certain risk of re-introducing it by making the inferential theory carry a philosophical burden. And apparently it was no afterthought, for the theory and the sign-language metaphor remained in his later works. What is even more interesting is the evolution of that metaphor.

As originally stated in the *New Theory of Vision*, Berkeley held visible ideas to be signs of tangible ones:

These signs are constant and universal, their connexion with tangible ideas has been learnt at our first entrance into the world . . . (§ 144). We cannot open our eyes but the ideas of distance, bodies, and tangible figures are suggested by them. So swift and sudden and unperceived is the transition from visible to tangible ideas that we can scarce forbear thinking them equally the immediate object of vision (§ 145).

A major change occurred in the *Principles*. For while Berkeley still speaks of ideas as signs, he realized that the *New Theory of Vision* account, which made visual ideas signs of tangible ones, contained the "vulgar error" (*Principles* §§ 44-5) that the extended, tangible objects existed independently of minds (cf. *New Theory of Knowledge* § 55). The error was corrected by immaterializing the tangible world by following Bayle's hint and treating extension as sensation in accordance with *esse is percipi*. Thus purged of error, Berkeley restates his position in *Principles* § 65:

. . . the connexion of ideas does not imply the relation of *cause* and *effect*, but only of a mark or *sign* with the thing *signified*. The fire which I see is not the cause of the pain I suffer upon my approaching it, but the mark that forewarns me of it . . . the reason why ideas are formed into machines, that is, artificial and regular combinations, is the same with that for combining letters into words. That a few original ideas may be made to signify a great number of effects and actions, it is necessary they be variously combined together: and to the end their use must be permanent and universal, these combinations must be made by *rule*, and with *wise contrivance*. By this means abundance of information is conveyed unto us, concerning what we are to expect from such and such actions, and what methods are proper to be taken, for the exciting such and such ideas: which in effect is all that I conceive to be distinctly meant, when it is said that by discerning the figure, texture, and mechanism of the inward parts of bodies, whether natural or artificial, we may attain to know the several uses and properties depending thereon, or the nature of the thing.

But having caught so "vulgar" an error in his theory, Berkeley seems to have been loath to do more than give this statement of its amended form, for very little use is made in the *Principles* of the analogy between ideas and signs, and it all but drops from view in the *Dialogues*. Rather, he is intent on spelling out the implications of his New Principle, *esse is percipi*: the *real* things are the *perceived* things, and "ideas of sense" and "things in the world" are but two names for the same thing. Even towards the beginning of the third *Dialogue* we find Philonous saying:

I am of a vulgar cast, simple enough to believe my senses, and leave things as I find them. To be plain, it is my opinion, that the real things are those very things I see and feel, and perceive by my senses. . . . And as I am no sceptic with regard to the nature of things, so neither am I as to their existence (*Works*, II, 229-30).

Later, however, in that same *Dialogue*, we read, "Strictly speaking . . . we do not see the same object we feel . . ." (*Works*, II, 245). In fact, Jessop gives us an editor's note at that point referring us to the *New Theory of Vision* § 49, which in turn we find reads: "But if we take a close and accurate view of things, it must be acknowledged that we never see and feel one and the same object." Thus Berkeley's regression to his earlier account is here evident; but to see it in application, note Philonous's comments on the case of the man who judges that an oar, partially in water, is crooked:

He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken. . . . But his mistake lies not in what he perceives immediately and at present (it being a manifest contradiction to suppose he should err in respect of that) but in the wrong judgment he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends to be

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connected with those immediately perceived: or concerning the ideas that, from what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances . . . (*Works*, II, 238).

It now appears that we no longer have an account of perception which "we Irish men" (cf. *Philosophical Commentaries*, 392 ff.) could accept, for our perceptual judgments are no longer strictly about what is immediately perceived but rather about what, on their basis, we expect to perceive in the future. A theoretical statement of this account of perception had, as we have seen, been given in *Principles* § 65. Fortunately, there had been no need to employ the theory. It had proved helpful enough throughout the *New Theory of Vision*, for on the basis of ideas we could infer the existence of things—unfortunately, however, of the wrong sort.

Nevertheless, when in the third *Dialogue* Berkeley is faced with a series of difficulties—and we have only cited one, error and illusion—he falls back on his old inferential theory of perception. But no longer can the visual idea be the sign of—that is, the basis for an inference to—a tangible thing. It is now apparently the basis for an inference to the basis of an inference. Put into the language metaphor, there is now virtually nothing for the signs to signify but other signs. There simply is no possibility, as of course there most assuredly was in the *New Theory of Vision*, of the "sudden transition" from an idea to a judgment about a body. One is stopped at the level of ideas and stays there.

My contention is that Berkeley's very uneasiness with this inferential theory itself stems from his ironclad determination *not* to discuss the object of knowledge, the thing-signified, in traditional conceptual terms or, for that matter, in any way which might bring extension back as something other than a sensation. Thus Berkeley's problem can now be stated, indeed the problem responsible for the inadequacies of the "solutions" of the third *Dialogue*, as the attempt to find something which signs can signify but which will not ruin his account of the immortality of the soul. He has, as I have tried to indicate, seen the fatal attraction of extension, and at whatever price he has banished it to sensation. And so when, for the first time in either the *Principles* or *Three Dialogues*, he tries to make his account of ideas as

⁴⁵The *Works of Thomas Reid*, ed. Sir Edinburgh, 1895). See Vol. I, p. 258.
William Hamilton (8th ed. 2 vols.

grounds for perceptual judgments (that is, as signs) carry a real philosophical burden, he seems to realize that to fill out his argument he ought to have something for the signs to signify. But while he does not complete his discussion on those lines, he does manage to give us several clues.

There are a variety of ways of accounting for the thing-signified, and I shall give two that I hold to be implicit in Berkeley's own test. A third—and, one may be tempted to say, the obvious—way out was taken by Thomas Reid. Not committed to the radical elimination of extension, Reid could allow the basic theory of the *New Theory of Knowledge* to develop along other lines. Although Reid frankly credits his account of sensation to Berkeley, he holds that Berkeley erroneously took sensation to be the only ingredient in our knowledge of the external world. Perception, Reid holds, involves a "conception or notion of the object perceived" and an immediate belief, not the effect of reasoning, in the object's present existence.⁴⁵

Certainly Sir William Hamilton's editorial footnote to the section of Reid's *Inquiry* entitled "Of Natural Signs" comes as no surprise to a reader familiar with Berkeley.

This whole doctrine of *natural signs*, on which his philosophy is in a great measure established, was borrowed by Reid, in principle, and even in expression, from Berkeley. Compare "Minute Philosopher," Dial. IV, §§ 7, 11, 12; "New Theory of Vision," §§ 144, 147; "Theory of Vision Vindicated," §§ 38-43 (*Works*, I, 122, n.).

Reid himself praises Berkeley on occasion; for example, "The 'Theory of Vision,' however, taken by itself, and without relation to the main branch of his system, contains very important discoveries, and marks of great genius" (*ibid.*, 281). But it is the *Theory of Vision* which seems most to appeal to him—for the simple reason that at that time Berkeley was "granting, or at least not denying, that there is a tangible world, which is really external, and which exists whether we perceive it or not." Or as Reid put it in the *Inquiry*:

It is therefore a just and important observation of the Bishop of Cloyne, That the visible appearance of objects is a kind of

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language used by nature, to inform us of their distance, magnitude, and figure (*ibid.*, 135 [The context indicates Reid has the *New Theory of Vision* in mind.]).

Reid went on to expand the fruitful suggestions Berkeley had offered into a complete account of our knowledge of external objects.

Why didn't Berkeley? The answer, I submit, is simply that he saw no way of moving in the direction Reid was later to take which would not be a return to the "way of concepts" of, for example, Malebranche—for any such return would mean the resuscitation of all the old problems over thought and extension as well as the collapse of his own novel account of the soul's immortality. In the *New Theory of Vision* ideas were signs, but the account of the things-signified contained, as we have seen, the "vulgar error." When in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* Berkeley felt required to employ the sign-language metaphor, he was not really prepared to introduce the things-signified it required. Actually, this may not be quite accurate. It may indeed be that because Berkeley was aware that if he used the language metaphor in the third *Dialogue* he ought to say explicitly what the signs mean, that he tried to circumvent this obligation by utilizing the theory without the metaphor. Thus, while we find precisely the same accounts of "connexions" and of ideas as bases for inferences that were entwined with the language metaphor in the *New Theory of Vision* and in the theoretical statement in *Principles* § 65, the actual metaphor itself is conspicuously absent from those accounts in the third *Dialogue*.

More important, one can find hints of two closely related theories, or at least of alternative expressions of the same theory, in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*, for Reid's "way out" is not the only way. Perhaps Berkeley meant his account of "connexions" to fill the gap of "meanings" in his language metaphor. This seems to me a plausible interpretation to maintain as implicit in Berkeley's text. When one knows certain patterns of connexions of ideas one knows, as Berkeley states in both *Principles* § 65 and in the third *Dialogue*, the nature of a thing. This could be taken to mean that one knows certain dispositional powers that a thing may have. Put another way, a sense idea may lead one to infer that certain other sense ideas will be per-

⁴⁶See my "Berkeley's Realisms," *Philosophical Quarterly*, VIII (1958), 41-53.

ceived, but what one knows which entitles one to draw that inference is not itself an idea or anything like one. What one then knows is presumably an aspect of the divine will—and as such, it can only be known notionally. That Berkeley had not himself clearly decided to interpret “connexions” in this fashion would seem to follow from his silence with respect to any such increased role for notional knowledge.

There is a second and similar line that might also be taken to be implicit in the third *Dialogue*, although it is a possibility I first advanced in an attempt to show the unsatisfactoriness of holding with Luce and Jessop that Berkeley’s “ideas of sense” are “sensa” or “sense-data,” and also that these ideas “persist” in some realist sense.⁴⁶ Taking Berkeley in the latter part of the third *Dialogue* as coming nearest to holding that “ideas of sense” are “sensa,” I sought to discover what ontological status one could possibly give these ideas in a Berkeleian framework. Now, of course, regardless of whether ideas of sense are “sensa” or simply physical objects, solving the problem of error along inferential lines may lead to a reintroduction of an appearance-reality distinction, with the embarrassing (for Berkeley) result that the object *perceived* is no longer necessarily the *real* object. But more immediately to the point is the perplexing problem that arises in the light of Philonous’s admission that God does not know via sensation. This very admission, though clearly striking a blow at the view that *sensa qua sensa* might persist, led me to think that Berkeley might have been hinting that the sense in which *sensa* persist is simply as *powers* in the mind of God to produce *sensa*. It also happens, as we have already observed, that on occasion Berkeley holds that all our perceptual knowledge is inferential—it is about what one will perceive if one does so and so. In other words, it is about possible *sensa*; but possible *sensa* exist as powers in the mind of God, and accordingly all our perceptual knowledge turns out to be about divine powers—and as such must be notional. I suggested at the time that giving such unlimited scope to notional knowledge, while hardly what Luce and Jessop were seeking to maintain, would not have dismayed the Bishop of Cloyne. (See *Philosophical Commentaries*, 52.)

I still think that giving such an expanded role to notional knowledge is one way, within the Berkeleian spirit, of dealing with Luce’s and

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Jessop's problem of the persistence of sensa; and I still think that it is a way which both philosophers would prefer to avoid since it plays havoc with the spirit-idea dichotomy. But I now think that this conclusion is what Berkeley is struggling with in the third *Dialogue*. For whether one starts worrying about what Berkeley means by knowing "connexions" or in what sense God perceives the "tree in the quad" when we do not, it seems to me clear that Berkeley wants something for his "ideas" to signify. In either case "knowing" turns out to be different from an awareness of ideas—namely, that which we know when we make inferences, that which ideas as signs signify, is a notionally known power in God's mind. Thus the sensation of color signifies a thing—or rather a notion or concept; in terms of the language metaphor, God's "meanings" rather than the orthography of His "words." Since the object of knowledge is thus *not* an idea of sense at all, there is no problem of that object's ontological status with respect to persistence or fear that ideas (signs) may be confused with what they lead us to infer (mean). But these are both genuine worries so long as one tries to interpret those peculiar "solutions" offered in the third *Dialogue* in terms of (a) the apparent analysis of ideas which precedes them there and in the *Principles*, and (b) the ontological implications, especially for God, of *esse is percipi*.

If I am correct in thinking that Berkeley took his proof for the immortality of the soul seriously and that he refused to tolerate any solution to philosophical difficulties that on his analysis might jeopardize that proof, then it might be worth looking at Berkeley's later writings. What we find, I think, is that in both *Alciphron* and *Siris* Berkeley has found a way of dealing with the real object of knowledge (with things-signified) without introducing the "evil" concept of extension—that entity which had seemed essential to a theory of our knowledge of the world, but an entity which when known seemed invariably to taint the spirituality of the knower, whether God or man. Berkeley now seems willing to accept the consequences of the language metaphor and deal explicitly with God's meanings. Note these comments from *Alciphron*:

It may be also worth while to observe that signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake, but only in their relative capacity, and for the sake of those things whereof they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind often overlooks them,

so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified. Thus, for example, in reading we run over the characters with the slightest regard, and pass on to the meaning. Hence it is frequent for men to say, they see words, and notions, and things in reading of a book; whereas in strictness they see only the characters which suggest words, notions, and things. And, by parity of reason, may we not suppose that men, not resting in, but overlooking the immediate and proper objects of sight, as in their own nature of small moment, carry their attention onward to the very thing signified, and talk as if they saw the secondary objects? which, in truth and strictness, are not seen, but only suggested and apprehended by means of the proper objects of sight, which alone are seen (IV, 12).

and from *Siris*:

252. There is a certain analogy, constancy, and uniformity in the phenomena or appearances of nature, which are a foundation for general rules: and these are a grammar for the understanding of nature, or that series of effects in the visible world whereby we are enabled to foresee what will come to pass in the natural course of things . . .

253. We know a thing when we understand it; and we understand it when we can interpret or tell what it signifies. Strictly, the sense knows nothing. We perceive indeed sounds by hearing, and characters by sight; but we are not therefore said to understand them. After the same manner, the phenomena of nature are alike visible to all; but all have not alike learned the connexion of natural things, or understand what they signify, or know how to vaticinate by them. . . . 254. As the natural connexion of signs with the things signified is regular and constant, it forms a sort of rational discourse (Sect. 152), and is therefore the immediate effect of an intelligent cause. This is agreeable to the philosophy of Plato . . . [see also §§ 258, 264, 290, 295, and 305 ff.]

Thanks to the language metaphor we can move on to the “things” signified by the signs. No longer need we fear that Berkeley’s signs

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merely signify other signs, for the sense signs are now taken as visual "letters" that God addresses to us. When we understand the "letters" and their formation into "words," we are on our way to learning the rules for their use (recall *Principles* § 65); that is, we shall know what He means. Berkeley can hardly be said to have been expansive in discussing this problem; but surveying all his comments, it seems, to take simply the sense of vision, that he thought of the various colors on a par with letters. Thus one could presumably focus one's attention on a particular "letter" in a particular "word." To know that a mark is a "letter" involves knowing rules, even though they differ from the rules for "words" not only in complexity but also because it is something less than obvious that the meaning of, for example, *man* can be found by an analysis of its constitutive letters. Berkeley seems satisfied simply to note that a few letters can form many words and then to turn this attention to the "meanings" of the "words." A wise man is better off than a child because he has learned God's sense language (cf. the third *Dialogue* [*Works*, II, 245]), for although they may see the same "words," the wise man, having learned the rules implicit in His use of a given "word" will know something about what next to expect, and so on.

Even in the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* Berkeley, as we have already seen, seemed to be holding that to know the meaning of the signs was different from merely "having" them. He seems to have held implicitly then, and explicitly later, that to know the meaning of God's "words" would, in effect, be to grasp a "nature," an "essence"; or at least one would know a series of powers, an aspect of God—a divine meaning which He articulates in sense signs.

As Luce has pointed out, this divine language theory is "an essential part of the final Berkeleyian philosophy" (*Works*, I, 152). It is also a part, admittedly subordinate, even of the *Principles*, as our citation from Section 65 revealed. My own suspicion is that the language metaphor was, subsequent to the *New Theory of Vision*, seen by Berkeley as a way of capitalizing on Malebranche's insight of "seeing all things in God," without at the same time bringing extension into God, and a way of getting the work of concepts done—without formally admitting them. Thus God could speak to us; and while our particular sense signs would differ from person to person, the meanings would be constant both for us and for God—which was in effect part of what Malebranche had hoped to achieve within his system with his

own metaphor. Furthermore, both Berkeley and Malebranche were alert to the entire issue of representationism. Malebranche had learned from Descartes that the merest hint of a representative theory of knowledge left one eternally seeking criteria for determining whether a knower's ideas stood in a relation of correspondance with the divine ideas. For Malebranche, the vision in God served not only to dispose of the innate idea solution to the Meno problem, but also it prevented the generation of the representation problem at the same stroke. Berkeley, for his part, had seen similar difficulties arise in theories of sense perception where subjective appearances were distinguished from objective realities.

Thus Berkeley tried to avoid a linguistic variant of the representation problem such as might be involved in giving an account of the relation between signs and meanings. Sense signs themselves are not the objects of knowledge, nor are they in any way "like" objects of knowledge, nor are they connected with those "objects" by any tie or correspondence which we can discern. When God says, for example, "tree," I know what He means if I have learned his "language"—and in fact the transition to what He means is so rapid that I may, as Reid later noted, have difficulty directing my attention to the "orthographic marks" (that is, the signs) themselves. To call the meanings archetypes would suggest that the transition was by no means so straightforward; hence Berkeley's reluctance to discuss archetypes with Johnson (*Works*, II, 267 f.). If, on the other hand, I have not learned His language, looking (so to speak) at *t-r-e-e* will hardly take me very far towards His meaning. Berkeley simply relegates the relation between signs and meanings to the "linguistic" learning process and bows before the infinite wonder of God (Malebranche had spoken of the relation between sensations and Ideas as being encompassed by the wondrous but unknown laws of conjunction of soul and body), apparently in full accord with the dictum, "Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent."

Not only can "linguistic Malebranchianism's" account of things-signified as being (not really passive things at all, but) divine meanings offer some help on the problem of the ontological status of the (unperceived) tree in the quad; one can restate Berkeley's attack on abstract ideas, arguments which, as Jessop has pointed out, Berkeley

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never retracted. Seen "linguistically," what Berkeley is suggesting is that abstraction from sense signs is simply ridiculous (Malebranche would have agreed). One may know what God means when He places "triangle" before me, but what can one possibly abstract from the letters themselves? Within the metaphor, that was what Locke, in Berkeley's eyes, was attempting. This obvious disparity between a string of letters and their meaning was accordingly seen by Berkeley, especially in *Siris*, as a (metaphorical) way of stating the point of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas while at the same time avoiding those terms, such as "resemble," "participate," and "represent," which had caused so much misunderstanding in the history of philosophy. Indeed, Berkeley may even have taken "learning a rule" as a grammatical formulation of recollection as a solution to the Meno problem; and thus while this account of meaning may be "agreeable to the philosophy of Plato," it is certainly Platonism with a difference.

It seems, then, that something approximating *esse* is *concipi* has been implicit in *esse* is *percipi* from the very outset. And yet, having eliminated ideas as mediating representative entities between mind and matter, Berkeley was hardly anxious to utilize language about concepts which might serve to reintroduce the very entity he had dismissed as both superfluous and productive of skepticism. (Note

⁴⁷If, as G. A. Johnston has suggested, Berkeley derived his doctrine of notions from John Sergeant, then notions are not representative in the Lockean sense. Nor are they for Digby or for Burthogge (where one finds them equated with "meanings"). The sources, however, for Berkeley's doctrine of notions—and for that matter of signs—still seems to me highly problematic, given the joint role they have played in philosophy at least since the Stoics. Peter Geach wonders whether St. Augustine's *notiones* may not be the source of Berkeley's notions (*Mental Acts* [London; Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958] p. 108 n.). This indeed may be part of the story, but the brilliant attack on abstractionism offered by Geach, which he takes to be in accord with St. Thomas, is, so far as I understand it, of the same pattern as much of Berkeley's. Partisans of Digby and Sergeant can of course retort that Berkeley could well have gotten his

"Thomism" from those two Roman Catholic philosophers—if, that is, they would grant that Geach has correctly interpreted St. Thomas.

⁴⁸Reid used several ingredients drawn from Berkeley's philosophy, but, less cautious, he talked of "concepts" as well. Despite the fact that he went to great lengths in discussing the dangers of being misled by "analogical expressions" in connection with conception (Reid's *Works*, I, 360 f., esp. 373-74), he was accused, largely on the very basis of "concepts," of implicitly holding to Lockean representationism. I have not, however, made any attempt to explore the lines a latter-day Arnauld might have taken against Berkeley's "linguistic Malebranchianism," although surely the question of the philosophical adequacy of Berkeley's version is still open in a sense in which Malebranche's original is not.

the caution he employs even in the *Principles* in connection with "notion" and how infrequently the term occurs in his later works.)

Thus when Berkeley felt the need for some organizational principles, he appealed not to concepts but to knowing the meaning of signs. And to know the meaning of a sign is to know the rules governing its use. That he should have found "rule" and "meaning" less problematic than "concept" may strike us as odd or perverse or both, but it nevertheless does seem plausible to say that the language metaphor has the advantage of calling our attention to the radical difference between hearing a language one understands and hearing a language that one doesn't; that is, of calling our attention to the mental activity of understanding (regardless of how one may wish ultimately to characterize it) that the former involves.

While "concept" and "notion" have been used to signify the mental capacities that we employ in understanding, there has been a tendency, especially in segments of the Aristotelian tradition, to think of them as objects of a sort that, in Berkeley's system, would be undistinguishable from his ideas.⁴⁷ Berkeley, however, has no intention of introducing concept-things along with concept-acts, for in the *Principles* he makes it clear that spirits and acts are "things" very different from his ideas. Accordingly, the language metaphor, by giving us an intuitive grasp of the radical difference between signs (ideas) and what they mean, may help prevent us from postulating mediating entities (as some had tried with "concepts") to bridge the unbridgeable.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the suggestion that we think of possessing knowledge as like having learned a language hints at the a-temporality of knowledge in a way Berkeley had been unable to characterize satisfactorily so long as he was looking to "words" (ideas) as the objects of knowledge. "Words" as "orthographic marks" may come and go, but their "meanings" (like Platonic Ideas?) do not—or at least not in the same way. And most important, "knowing a rule" is a *power* possessed by a spirit; *but* it is possessed in a way that does not compromise the immateriality of the soul. Thus the very metaphor that had originally led Berkeley into the "vulgar error" is found by him ultimately to yield a solution to philosophical difficulties which is commensurate with his transcendent concern with the immateriality, and hence immortality, of the soul. Finally, it is interesting to note that where

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other philosophers may have been led into metaphysics by language, Berkeley gives every appearance of having been led into language by metaphysics. Instead of looking for metaphysical entities "in" God for our language *really* to name, Berkeley seeks to avoid metaphysical entities by looking to God for His language.

Let me, however, recapitulate the points that I have tried to make. I started out by suggesting that Berkeley's stated concern over the immortality of the soul might be worth taking seriously and not as a mere deistic sop to orthodoxy. I suggested further that the immortality issue might throw some light on several strictly philosophical issues, especially in the third *Dialogue*, as well as on the question of Platonism in Berkeley's later work. Thus by reference to the Locke-Stillingfleet controversy, I tried to show (a) that an important feature of that controversy concerned the soul's immortality and (b) that a theologically acceptable account of spiritual substance did not seem to issue from Locke's "way of ideas," for not only might matter think, but substances were a "something, I know not what."

On the other hand, in Malebranche's immaterialism, stimulating as it seems to have been to Berkeley, the account of a substantial self rested ultimately on the intelligibility of intelligible extension. Unfortunately for Malebranche, his arguments were not given the interpretations he intended, and he spent his later years attempting to ward off charges of Spinozism. Finally, Bayle offered a clue—treat extension as a sensation. The world would thus consist of but *two* sorts of entities: ideas and the spirits which have them. As for spirits, they are the active things in which ideas necessarily inhere. No matter, no intelligible matter, no concept of extension, remains. Neither ideas nor spirits being material, no threat to the immortality of the soul remains. Ideas are not merely passive; they must be "in" something—"in" a substance, and that substance is accordingly a thinking thing; that is, a spirit. (Berkeley would, I think, have found Hume's account of the self as unintelligible as Hume himself subsequently found it).

Nevertheless, when Berkeley set about his philosophical tasks, he quickly ran into difficulties. The *New Theory of Vision* account of perception failed at the crucial juncture. The taint of materialism was still present. No such "error" corrupts the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues*. He has there stated his immaterialism. He has fulfilled the Cartesian dream and revealed a pure spirit, free from any blemish

of matter or extension, a spirit which at long last was found to have no philosophical disqualifications as a candidate for immortality.

But in the third *Dialogue*, faced with the problem of perceptual error, Berkeley attempts to extricate himself by way of variations on the *New Theory of Vision* account. The history of philosophy is cluttered with "solutions" to the problem of perceptual error that end by denying perceptual truth, and Berkeley was clearly hoping to avoid both Scylla and Charybdis; but the sign-language metaphor as stated failed him. What troubled Berkeley, I believe, was that while he realized the need to explain error, he also realized that he had offered a coherent, if ingenious, account of a substantial self. The *New Theory of Vision* had taught Berkeley the dangers of the language metaphor, and recent history had taught him the dangers of extension; and he did not propose to throw over his doctrine of spirits in order to accommodate a metaphor.

Precisely because Berkeley was aware of the theologically catastrophic attempts that had been made to deal with both matter and extension, he refused to take what to Reid, Hamilton, and perhaps ourselves, may seem the obvious step in completing his theory of perceptual signs. It was not an epistemological catastrophe that Berkeley feared; indeed he was willing to risk that in the third *Dialogue*. It was the religious catastrophe of making "soul" unintelligible by reintroducing into his theologically antiseptic system those entities which, rightly or wrongly, had adulterated Cartesianism—matter and extension.

I have, however, suggested that one can find implicit in the third *Dialogue* the view that the thing signified by the sense sign is a divine power. The tree in the quad that God perceives while we are asleep is not a sensed tree, since God does not know via sensation. What persists are powers, and our knowledge consists of them. In the language metaphor this amounts to saying that we learn God's language. For Berkeley, having once learned (in the *New Theory of Vision*) the dangers from the referent (matter) side in the sign-thing signified duality, remained extremely careful on the other (the conceptual) side to avoid "giving offense" by hypostatizing meaning. Content to speak of how God uses His "words" and of His "rules," Berkeley successfully avoided elaborating an account of archetypes, perhaps because he sensed problems about which we have heard a

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good deal in recent years. It is this line, shrouded in mystery as it may at times seem to be, that Berkeley takes in his later writings and which has apparently led commentators to think that *Alciphron*, and especially *Siris*, mark a radical change in Berkeley's position. In discussing the *Principles* and *Three Dialogues* I have tried to show that no such change occurred. Berkeley is simply filling out his sign theory in the only way that seems to have occurred to him as compatible with the utter and complete elimination of matter and extension required by his proof of the immortality of the soul.

LIFE AND LIVING BEINGS

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How do Aristotle and St. Thomas define life? Specifically, is immanent action the hallmark of life for them? The motion of the particles within the atom is also immanent, for it "remains within" the atom. This constitutes a problem for some Scholastic philosophers in defining life.

We rightly resent the unjust accusation that Scholastics tend to claim Aristotle and Aquinas as their leaders without actually bothering to read them. But perhaps it is not too rash to suggest that some of the difficulties connected with the definition of life could be solved if we read the masters carefully on this point.

This paper cannot pretend to treat with any completeness the notion of life in itself, nor can it be expected to deal with the concept as found in the sciences of biology and psychology; and it would be most impertinent to presume to go very far into the life of God Himself, the contemplation of whose life we will not exhaust through all eternity. The aim is simply to examine the basic notion of life in the writings of St. Thomas, see if we can discover in what sense we may call God "living" and even "life," and perhaps solve some of the apparent difficulties that arise in the use of these terms as transcendental and analogous. No great attempt has been made to take account of the vast literature devoted to the subject by the later Scholastics; the attempt is merely to examine the writings of St. Thomas himself—with, of course, some reference to Aristotle, without which Aquinas is never fully intelligible.

Most modern Scholastics define life as immanent activity or at least the capacity for immanent activity. As a typical example among many, Sheen in his *God and Intelligence*¹ states on page 242 that "life is activity" and on page 243 he makes the definition of life to consist in immanent activity. There are two difficulties here: first, making life consist in activity or operation, the *actus secundus* of the Scholastics; secondly, making the *essential* note of vital activity consist in its immanence.

The first difficulty is fairly easily disposed of. In fact, it was immediately subjoined to the first statement in the above paragraph "or at least the capacity for immanent activity" because many authors do provide for this question by some such modified formula. And rightly, for the mind of Aquinas on this point is quite clear. He devotes a whole article to the question, "utrum vita sit quaedam operatio," and of course the answer is in the negative, except that it may be called such in a strictly secondary and improper sense. Thus the last sentence of the body of the article:

Sometimes, however, life is used less properly for the operations from which its name is taken, and thus the Philosopher says (*Ethic.* ix. 9) that to live is principally to sense or to understand.²

He is quite definite on this particular point in innumerable other passages, but since he cites Aristotle in the above quoted excerpt it should be mentioned that in the *De Anima*, and in St. Thomas's commentary on it, this position is also maintained.³ Incidentally, it may well be remarked that the expression "capacity for immanent action"

¹Fulton J. Sheen, *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* (New York, 1938). Examples could be multiplied. Cf. Michael Maher, S.J., *Psychology, Empirical and Rational* (9th. ed. London, 1933), p. 551.

²"Quandoque tamen vita sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a quibus nomen vitae assumitur; sicut dicit Philosophus [*Ethic.* IX, 9, 1170a19] quod vivere principaliter est sentire, vel intelligere" (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 18, a. 2).

³Cf. *In I De An.*, lect. 14 (Pirotta

No. 209); also *In I Sent.*, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1 ad 1, etc.

⁴Aristotle, *De An.* ii. 1. 412a14-15; *ibid.* 2. 413a 23—413b2, etc. (The expression does occur in the *Metaphysics*, ix, in another context.)

⁵*In II De An.*, lect. 1 (Pirotta No. 219).

⁶*ST*, I, q. 18, a. 2.

⁷*Ibid.*, a. 1.

⁸*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 8.

⁹*CG.*, I, cap. 97-98.

¹⁰*ST*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1.

is not perfectly representative of the mind of Aquinas, since, as we shall see later, his thought is centered not on any capacity but on the very *being* of living things. This is brought out clearly in the two places just referred to, to which we shall return in due time.

The second difficulty, the note of immanence, is the more troublesome, especially from the standpoint of reconciling such a definition of life with the intra-atomic activity of what everyone admits are non-living beings. Let us see whether St. Thomas ever defines life in terms of immanent activity.

To begin with, it would be a strong indication if we could find the phrase in Aristotle, upon whom Aquinas draws so heavily in these and similar matters. Yet the Greek equivalent of "immanent activity" does not even appear in the entire text of the *De Anima*; and though the present writer cannot assert the same of his other psychological and biological works categorically, such would seem to be the case. At least it is certain that in those passages where we would most expect it—namely, where Aristotle is laying down the essential distinction between living and nonliving things—he does not do so in terms of immanent activity at all.⁴ This is basic to an approach to St. Thomas's position; and it should further be noted at once that he will hold with Aristotle's first book of the *Physics* that *every* natural body has within itself an internal principle of motion.

Coming to St. Thomas himself, an examination of the pertinent passages may be divided into two tasks: first, to see if he departs from Aristotle by introducing the notion of immanent activity into his definition of life when laying down the distinction between living and non-living things; secondly, to examine those passages in which he does distinguish immanent and transient activity to see whether he does so with any view to the notion of vital action as such. The answer to the first task is a decided negative. Some of the passages investigated in this connection are his commentary on the *De Anima*, II "Propria ratio vitae . . .";⁵ his basic article in the *Summa Theologiae* defining life⁶ and the article applying the distinction to living and nonliving things;⁷ in the *De Veritate*;⁸ in the *Contra Gentiles* where he defines life and applies it to God;⁹ and where he applies the notion of life to the distinction between the active and contemplative life.¹⁰ The second task, that of inquiring into those numerous passages where he does introduce

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the terminology of immanent and transient action, reveals this curious fact for certain modern Scholastics to puzzle over: not only does St. Thomas not define life in terms of immanent action, as we have just seen, but in all the places in which the notion of immanence is introduced he never once refers this term to a distinction between vital and nonvital action. He often divides action into immanent and transient,¹¹ but he is always talking of vital activity and of *viventia* as the subject of *both* of these motions. This is true even when he is speaking of God, for here, too, both the immanent and transient actions are vital actions.

So much for what might be termed the negative side of this study; namely, the clearing away of some false notions (or at least some badly misplaced emphasis) prevalent among textbook writers and the realization that it would be wise to take our notion of life directly from Aristotle and St. Thomas themselves.

II

The next step will be to determine just how St. Thomas does define life, if not as immanent activity. To begin with, life is an abstract term, as St. Thomas often notes. He prefers to deal with the concrete, contrary to the notion of those who imagine that "metaphysical" is somehow synonymous with "abstract." He usually goes at once to the activities of living things: nutrition, growth, reproduction of kind, knowledge, appetite, and so on; and in these he finds adequate grounds for distinguishing living from nonliving things—even such

¹¹For example, *ibid.*, I, q. 14, prologue and a. 2; *ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3 ad 1; *ibid.*, q. 23, a. 2 ad 1; *ibid.*, q. 27, a. 3; *ibid.*, q. 54, a. 2; q. 56, a. 1.

¹²"Sic ergo dicendum est de vita. Nam vitae nomen sumitur ex quodam exteriori apparenti circa rem, quod est movens seipsum; non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc significandum, sed ad significandum substantiam cui convenit secundum naturam suam movere seipsam, vel agere se quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc vivere nihil aliud est quam esse in tali natura; et *vita* significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen *cursus* significat ipsum currere in abstracto. Unde vivum non est praedicatum accidentale, sed substantiale" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 2 ad fin.).

¹³"Vita enim viventis est ipsum vivere in quadam abstractione signatum; sicut cursus, secundum rem, non est aliud quam currere. Vivere autem viventium est ipsum esse eorum, ut patet per Philosophum [*De Anima*, II, 415b13] . . . oportet quod vivere nihil aliud sit quam tale esse ex tali forma proveniens" (*CG*, I, cap. 98).

¹⁴"Ad secundum dicendum, quod *vita* non hoc modo se habet ad vivere, sicut essentia ad esse, sed sicut cursus ad currere; quorum unum significat actum in abstracto, aliud in concreto. Unde non sequitur, si vivere sit esse, quod *vita* sit essentia" (*ST*, I, q. 54, a. 1 ad 2).

¹⁵God is His life in the same sense, and precisely because, He is His existence—which of course is not true of other things.

as have motion within them, be they Aristotle's fire or the modern physicist's atom. But he does recognize the validity of the abstract term and assigns its meaning in such passages as these:

The same must be said of life. The name is given from a certain external appearance, namely, self-movement, yet not precisely to signify this, but rather a substance to which self-movement and the application of itself to any kind of operation, belong naturally. To live, accordingly, is nothing else than to exist in this or that nature; and life signifies this, though in the abstract, just as the word *running* denotes *to run* in the abstract. Hence *living* is not an accidental but an essential predicate.¹²

For *life* in a living being is the same as *to live* expressed in the abstract; just as running is in reality the same as to run. Now *in living things to live is to be*, as the Philosopher declares (2 *De Anima*) . . . to live is nothing but a particular kind of existence resulting from a particular kind of form.¹³

Life, then, is nothing more or less than the abstract term for the very being of living things. It is not a thing, an essence, as St. Thomas says:

The relation between *life* and *to live* is not the same as that between *essence* and *to be*; but rather as that between *a race* and *to run*, one of which signifies the act in the abstract, and the other in the concrete. Hence it does not follow, if *to live* is *to be*, that *life* is *essence*.¹⁴

Of course what is insisted on in the last sentence will be seen to apply only to created living things, for in God His life is identified with His essence. St. Thomas merely asserts here that it does not necessarily follow of *all* things. That it can be so about God is only because of the unique way in which abstract things can be predicated of God's essence, thanks to His infinite perfection and absolute simplicity.¹⁵ The parallel terms, then, would seem to run something like this:

vivens — ens
vivere — esse
vita — existentia
vitalitas — entitas
quod vivit — quod est

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Life, therefore, for St. Thomas and the Stagirite denotes not an activity or an accident or a mere capacity but something as intimately connected with the nature of a thing as existence itself: "vivere est esse viventium." It is the kind of *being* which characterizes living things. Now what is meant by "being"? For the Scholastic philosopher (as indeed for everyone) "res dicit essentiam cum connotatione τοῦ esse" ¹⁶—"a transcendental relation to existence," which Aristotle expresses when he says of *is* that its "most fundamental and proper sense is the relation of an actuality to that of which it is an actuality." ¹⁷ We should expect, then, that the definition of life given by St. Thomas would involve the notion of some special perfection of being, some high degree of reality or actuality, some plenitude of being, or, if we may transfer to metaphysics the poetical connotation of the word, something in a being which involves a power of "realization." Let us examine the pertinent texts.

The proper essence of life is this, that something is naturally such as to move itself, taking motion in a large sense, inasmuch as even intellectual activity is called a kind of motion. For, we

¹⁶Cf. A. Marc, "L'Idée de l'être," *Archives de Philosophie*, X (1933), 87-90.

¹⁷Aristotle, *De An.*, ii. 1. 412b9 (translation my own).

¹⁸"Propria autem ratio vitae est hoc, quod aliquid est natum movere seipsum, large accipiendo motum, prout etiam intellectualis operatio motus quidam dicitur. Ea enim sine vita esse dicimus, quae ab exteriori tantum principio moveri possunt" (*In II De An.*, lect. 1 [Pirota No. 219]).

¹⁹"... sciendum quod vivere proprie est eorum quae habent motum et operationem ex seipsis, sine hoc quod moveantur ab aliis" (*In I De An.*, lect. 14 [Pirota No. 209]).

²⁰"Illud enim proprie vivere dicimus quod in se ipso habet motus, vel operationes quascumque; ex hoc enim sunt dicta primo aliqua vivere, quia visa sunt in se ipsis habere aliquid ea movens secundum quemcumque motum. Et hinc processit nomen vitae ad omnia quae in se ipsis habent operationis propriae principium. Unde et ex hoc quod aliquae intelligunt, vel sentiunt, vel volunt, vivere dicuntur, non solum ex

hoc quod secundum locum moventur, vel secundum augmentum. Illud ergo esse quod habet res prout est movens se ipsam ad operationem aliquam, dicitur proprie vita rei, quia vivere viventis est esse, ut in II de Anima dicitur" (*De Ver.*, q. 4, a. 8).

²¹"Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando incipit ex se motum habere, et tandiu iudicamus animal vivere, quamdiu talis motus in eo apparet; quando vero jam ex se non habet aliquem motum, sed movetur tantum ab alio, tunc dicitur animal mortuum per defectum vitae. Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent . . ." (*ST*, I, q. 18, a. 1).

²²"Adhuc, vivere secundum hoc aliquibus attributum est, quod visa sunt per se, non ab alio, moveri . . . alia vero omnia ab aliquo exteriori moventur . . ." (*CG*, I, cap. 97).

²³"... vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab aliis mota" (*ST*, I, q. 18, a. 3).

²⁴"... ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum, vel operationem aliquam" (*ibid.*, a. 1).

say that those things are without life which can be moved only by an external principle.¹⁸

. . . we must know that to live properly belongs to those things which have motion and activity from themselves without being moved by others.¹⁹

For that we properly say lives which has in itself motion or any kind of operation. For from this things were first said to live because they were observed as having in themselves something moving them according to some kind of motion. And from this the name life was applied to all things which in themselves have a principle of their own proper operation. Consequently from this that some things understand or sense or will they are said to live, not only from this that they are moved in place or increase in size. Consequently the being which a thing has insofar as it moves itself to some operation is properly called the life of the thing, because "to live in a living thing is being," as it said in the *De Anima*, II.²⁰

We say then that an animal begins to live when it begins to move of itself: and as long as such movement appears in it, so long is it considered to be alive. When it no longer has any movement of itself, but is only moved by another, then its life is said to fail, and the animal to be dead. Whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement . . .²¹

Again. Life is ascribed to certain things inasmuch as they seem to be set in motion of themselves and not by another . . . while all others are moved by some other thing . . .²²

. . . a thing is said to live in so far as it operates of itself and not as moved by another . . .²³

Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind . . .²⁴

What conclusions can we gather from these texts and from the similar pertinent ones from Aristotle cited earlier? First, that there is no mention of immanence as the hallmark of life, as has already been

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pointed out. Secondly, that what does characterize vital activity—and that whether immanent or transient—is the feature of being self-initiating (“incipit *ex se* motum habere”), self-perfective (“δι’ ἑαυτοῦ”), or self-actualizing (“se agunt *ad* motum”). In a word, the living thing contains more actuality (being in act) within itself and is consequently less dependent on things outside itself (“alia vero omnia ab aliquo exteriori principio”) for its activity, whether immanent or transient. These statements sum up, in terms of self-contained actualization, or perfection of being, the notion of life in St. Thomas much better than any reference to immanence.

At this point the objection suggests itself that the average modern Scholastic does not fail to attach to the word “immanent” as used in his definition of life much or all of the notion of “self-activating” or “self-perfecting” which has been expounded here, and that thus there is little point to this phase of our discussion. The answer is (a) that this is due to what might be termed a historical accident in the development of terminology and (b) that this meandering is the result and also the cause of confusion which could have been avoided had the language of St. Thomas never been abandoned. The first, (a), means simply that the textbook writers got away from the definition of St. Thomas probably without even knowing it and fastened upon the word “immanens” which appears so often in his writings without realizing that they were putting it to a use which this study shows he never gave it; then later on, when confronted with certain difficulties, they amplified their meaning of the word “immanens” until after a number of centuries they were using it to express a Thomistic idea which we have seen is never so expressed in St. Thomas. The second, (b), implies that once the word “immanens” had been adopted but its original use in St. Thomas lost sight of, confusion was bound to result. Then, when it became necessary to clarify its meaning in terms of real difficulties, a host of meanings were imposed on the word which it does not bear either in the speech of St. Thomas or of ordinary men. Such an abuse of language is not only inexcusable in itself but tends to masquerade as philosophical difficulty.

Surely *immanent* comes from *in* and *manere*, and is defined by

25“ . . . duplex est actio. Una quae transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare. Alia quae manet in agente; ut intelligere, sentire, et velle. Quarum haec est differentia: quia prima

actio non est perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsius moti; secunda autem actio est perfectio agentis” (*ibid.*, a. 3 ad 1).

both Aquinas and your modern Webster as "remaining within"—to say that it means self-perfecting or self-activating is a poor excuse for not going back to Aristotle and St. Thomas when faced with a difficulty. It is warping words instead of clarifying thought. A typical passage responsible for the historical situation might be the following:

. . . action is twofold. Actions of one kind pass out to external matter, as to heat or to cut; whilst actions of the other kind remain in the agent, as to understand, to sense, and to will. The difference between them is this, that the former action is the perfection not of the agent that moves, but of the thing moved; whereas the latter action is the perfection of the agent.²⁵

Now, here St. Thomas uses the notions of immanent and transient; moreover, the examples he gives of immanent activity are vital actions, those of transient are not. But what is important to note is that he does not make the difference consist in the fact that in the one case the action remains in the agent. He assigns the difference in terms of self-perfection. This is important not only for understanding his position but also in the light of modern knowledge. If we hold the definition of life given by St. Thomas, then the present writer sees no great difficulty in saying that both vital and nonvital activities can be either immanent or transient. St. Thomas certainly says over and over again that the activities of God and man are both, and implies as much for the elements in his adoption of the Aristotelian definition of a *nature* as having a principle of motion within itself, as shall be discussed shortly. In this case there would be nothing amiss in saying that, for instance, the motion of the electrons around the nucleus is immanent action, while the giving off of heat or gamma rays is transient, just as in my lifting a rock there is both immanent and transient action. In addition, it might be noted that a return to the true Thomistic definition of life would neatly circumvent most of the pertinent implications of the Suarezian-Thomistic controversies as to whether "*actio est in passo*" and whether immanent action is in the predicament of "*actio*" or of quality.

The next step is to apply this generic notion of life to the various things we call living, with a view to seeing if it is verified in them and also if it distinguishes them from nonliving things.

One reason for insisting on a definition of life in terms of the *being* of the living thing, aside from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas ("vivere est esse viventium" occurs with almost wearying frequency in both), is that only by going to something as fundamental as being itself can we be sure that we are talking sense when we attempt to apply the definition to everything from God to a carrot. St. Thomas recognizes in life a wide sweep of transcendentalism second only to being and its attributes;²⁶ and when he himself is discussing the applicability of the term to its various inferiors (including what the Scholastics call "primo diversa") he very frequently reminds us that such a term *must* be analogical.²⁷ And to safeguard what is to follow shortly it may be well to remind ourselves here that analogous terms are *equivocal* ("a consilio") and characterized by diversity or dissimilarity. The analogy, we can easily suspect, will be one of proper proportionality; here it will not be a proportion of an essence to its existence as in the analogy of being, but a proportion of an essence to a certain degree of self-perfectiveness (or independence of exterior principles) in its operation.

Two things especially must be kept in mind in working out the applications of the analogy. First, excessive preoccupation with the Aristotelian categories tends to stratify our philosophical thinking into that form of "block universe" of which Henri Bergson has accused us. The corrective for this is in the influence which Neoplatonism exercised on the mind of Aquinas, tending to ease the sharpness of our distinction of things into a graded hierarchy of continuity from the lowest to the highest. This is brought out in such quotations from the Pseudo-Dionysius as this:

²⁶*Ibid.*, q. 103, a. 2.

²⁷Cf. *ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3 et ad 1, 2, 3.

²⁸"Et ideo vis generativa quodammodo appropinquat ad dignitatem animae sensitivae, quae habet operationem in res exteriores, licet excellentiori modo et universaliori; *supremum enim inferioris naturae attingit id quod est infimum superioris*, ut patet per Dionysium, in vii cap. *De Div. Nom.* [3, PG 3,

872] (*ibid.*, q. 78, a. 2 [italics mine]).

²⁹"Illud autem maxime convenit alicui per seipsum quod est proprium ei, et ad quod maxime inclinatur; et ideo unumquodque vivens ostenditur vivere ex operatione sibi maxime propria, ad quam maxime inclinatur . . ." (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1).

³⁰*Ibid.*, I, q. 18, a. 3.

³¹CG, IV, cap. 11.

Therefore the generative power, in a way, approaches to the dignity of the sensitive soul, which has an operation extending to extrinsic things, although in a more excellent and more universal manner; for that which is highest in an inferior nature approaches to that which is lowest in the higher nature, as is made clear by Dionysius (*Div. Nom.* vii.).²⁸

Consequently, we should expect that, as an example of a pointed application of this principle, a molecule is much more like a plant than the plant is like God, in spite of the fact that God and the plant fall under the same predicate "living," whereas the molecule and the plant do not.

The second principle useful in this matter is put quite clearly by the Angelic Doctor himself thus:

That most belongs to a thing by itself which is proper to it, and to which it is most inclined. Therefore every living thing is shown to live from an operation which is most proper to it to which it is most inclined.²⁹

Hence, we must not expect to find a univocal similarity in the kind of motion or operation to which the various classes of living things *se agunt*, but rather such operation as is proportioned to their nature. Now, we have seen in Part II of this paper that what characterizes living things is a certain self-contained perfection, an independence of activity. But what is proper to God is absolute independence and the total plenitude of being within Himself; and what is proper to creatures is utter dependence and varying degrees of lack of being. Therefore it is only natural to conclude that we shall see the implications of these statements in the hierarchy of living things. In fact, with such a foundation the remainder of this study should flow easily from what has been laid down.

St. Thomas works out the analogy for all orders of living things very beautifully and fully at least once in the *Summa Theologiae* ³⁰ and once in the *Contra Gentiles*.³¹ These passages are too long to quote here but are readily understandable in the light of the principles already discussed. We shall examine only those two cases which cause the greatest difficulty; namely, (a) the distinction of intra-

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atomic activity from vital activity and (b) the application of the term "life" to God. For these two instances should be the acid test of whether our definition of life is adequate and accurate.

Those who find that intra-atomic activity theory presents a new difficulty in the definition of life should forget immanence and read very carefully the answers St. Thomas gives to the three objections with which he opens his discussion of life in the *Summa Theologiae*.³² Granted that he knew nothing of the orbital movement of electrons, it still seems that his principles there are adequate. Since he was not bothered, as we have seen, with the modern Scholastic's preoccupation with immanence, he simply points out that no matter what activity the nonliving body may have, it is not characterized by any self-initiation. Following the conclusion of the first book of the *Physics*, any and every natural body has within itself a principle of motion, for that is what a nature means for Aristotle. What differentiates them? In Book VIII of the *Physics* Aristotle points out that, of the natural bodies that are not alive, some, like a lever, receive a given motion which is "unnatural," while others, like fire, have a motion that is "natural"; but in either case the motion is received from an external principle, not self-initiated, and is thus distinct from the living thing which does not receive its motion from outside, either here and now (the lever) or when its nature was constituted (the fire).³³ And St. Thomas interprets the mind of his forerunner in the same sense commenting on another place:

It is to be known that the philosopher says the soul is the first act . . . also to distinguish it from the forms of elements, *which always have their operation* . . .³⁴

This is confirmed by the texts quoted from St. Thomas in Part Two above on the nature of life, for whatever else one may say for the atom, it certainly does not "incipit a se motum habere" nor "se agere ad motum" but rather it "semper habet suam actionem"; and since it is not self-subsistent like God, it must have received this natural

³²ST, q. 18, a. 1.

³³Physics, viii. 4. 254b7-256a3. And cf. ST, I, q. 18, a. 1 ad 2.

³⁴"Sciendum autem quod Philosophus dicit animam esse actum primum . . . etiam ut distinguat eam a formis elementorum, quae semper habent suam

actionem . . ." (*In II De An.*, lect. 1 [Pirotta No. 229]. Italics mine.)

³⁵ST, I, q. 18, a. 3 ad fin.

³⁶CG, I, cap. 98.

³⁷*In XII Metaphys.*, lect. 8 (Cathala-Spiazzi No. 2544).

motion, along with its being, "ab exteriori principio." And valence and chemical affinity would seem to fit quite nicely into the Aristotelian conception of the "natural" motion of an element.

IV

Our final task is to examine how what has been said can be utilized in our application of the predicates "life" and "living" to the divine nature, and then in a concluding section we may consider briefly the notion of life as realized in the entire hierarchy of living things.

First, since God is His existence or *esse*, there is no difficulty in saying that He is also life or *vivere*—"vivere est esse viventium" again. The notion appears whenever St. Thomas is discussing God's life, for example in the *Summa Theologiae*,³⁵ in the *Contra Gentiles*,³⁶ and in his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*.³⁷ God is certainly a being who contains within Himself the source of His own actuality and perfection, independently of any external principle. His activities are certainly all self-initiated. The only apparent difficulty would seem to lie in the word "source" as implying somehow that God is the *cause* of those activities which are identified with His own divine nature; in other words, as if the expressions "perfecting" or "moving" implied some change in God. The answer at first is simple and has already been given in the principles laid down for the application of the notion of life to its inferiors: these notions must be understood analogically, and (most important) they cannot be understood apart from the kind of activity which is proper to each being, as St. Thomas told us in the above passage from the *Summa* (n. 29). In other words, the life of God is obviously going to contain certain infinite perfections proper only to Him who is pure act, uncaused, immutable, and so on. But it is a little more subtle to elaborate an explanation of how this is compatible with the notions of motion and perfecting.

Much light is thrown on the matter if we return to the philosophy of Aristotle to see what he thinks of the activity most typical of God; namely, understanding. In many places he concerns himself with the question of how this can be considered motion.

The problem might be suggested: if thinking is a passive affection, then if mind is simple and impassible and has nothing

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in common with anything else, as Anaxagoras says, how can it come to think at all? For interaction between two factors is held to require a precedent community of nature between the two factors.³⁸

What is bothering him here, among other things, is that motion as he defined it in the *Physics* seems to involve an imperfection and the corruption of a contrary. Neither of these could be admitted in God, of course. But the answer is that understanding is a perfect motion rather than an imperfect one and does not involve the corruption of a contrary but at most an ἐπίδοσις, a realization of the fullness of the being of the knower, which is somehow all things.

This implies a third meaning of "a knower," one who is already realizing his knowledge—he is a knower in actuality and in the most proper sense is knowing, e.g., this is A. Both the former are potential knowers, who realize their respective potentialities, the one by a change of quality, i.e., repeated transitions from one state to its opposite under instruction, the other by the transition from the inactive possession of sense or grammar to their active exercise. The two kinds of transition are distinct.

Also the expression "to be acted upon" has more than one meaning: it may mean either the extinction of one of two contraries by the other, or the maintenance of what is potential by the agency of what is actual and already like what is acted upon, with such likeness as is compatible with one's being actual and the other potential. For what possesses knowledge becomes

³⁸Aristotle, *De An.* iii. 4. 429b23-26.

³⁹*Ibid.* ii. 5. 417a28-b9. Note that the words in the parentheses are Aristotle's own.

⁴⁰*Ethic. Nich.* i. 8. 1099a14.

⁴¹*In II De An.*, lect. 11 (Pirota Nos. 365-69).

⁴²"Et quia motus, qui est in rebus corporalibus, de quo determinatum est in libro *Physicorum*, est de contrario in contrarium, manifestum est quod sentire, si dicatur motus, est alia species motus ab ea de qua determinatum est in libro *Physicorum*; ille enim motus est actus existentis in potentia, quia videlicet recedens ab uno contrario, quamdiu movetur, non attingit alterum contrarium, quod est terminus motus,

sed est in potentia. Et quia omne quod est in potentia, in quantum huiusmodi, est imperfectum, ideo ille motus est actus imperfecti. Sed iste motus est actus perfecti; est enim operatio sensus jam facti in actu, per suam speciem. Non enim sentire convenit sensui nisi in actu existenti; et ideo simpliciter est alter a motu physico. Et huiusmodi motus dicitur proprie operatio, ut sentire et intelligere et velle" (*In III De An.*, lect. 12 [Pirota No. 766]). Cf. also No. 160.

⁴³"... moveri et pati sumuntur aequivoce, secundum quod intelligere dicitur esse quoddam moveri vel pati, ut dicitur" (*ST*, I, q. 14, a. 2 ad 2).

an actual knower by a transition which is either not an alteration of it at all (being in reality a development into its true self or actuality) or at least an alteration in a quite different sense from the usual meaning.

Hence it is wrong to speak of a wise man as being "altered" when he uses his wisdom . . .³⁹

Aristotle utilizes this notion of *epidosis* in the *Ethics* ⁴⁰ when speaking of the virtuous actions of the good, and St. Thomas uses it often in explaining how such acts as *intelligere* can be called *motus* in a loose sense and without implying imperfection. Thus he expands at some length in his commentary on the passage just quoted,⁴¹ and in another shorter passage speaks in the same vein:

And because motion which is found in bodily things (which is dealt with in the book of the *Physics*) is from one contrary to another, it is clear that sensing, if it is called motion, is a different species of motion from that which is treated in the book of the *Physics*. For that motion is the act of a thing existing in potency, because, that is, going away from one of the contraries, as long as it is moved, it does not reach the other contrary which is the term of the motion, but is in potency to it. Because every thing which is in potency as such, is imperfect; therefore that motion is the act of an imperfect being. But this motion is the act of a perfect thing; for it is the operation of a sense already put into act, by its species. For sensing does not pertain to the sense except as the latter is in act and therefore it is simply other than physical motion. And this kind of motion is properly called operation, as sensing and understanding and willing.⁴²

Consequently we find him telling us in the *Summa* that "movement and passion are taken equivocally, according as to understand is described as a kind of movement or passion, as stated in *De Anima* iii"; ⁴³ that is, when we apply to spiritual operations as such the terms passion and motion, we turn those terms from their original meaning. We do it in marking off living things in general,

whereby it is clear that those things are properly called living that move themselves by some kind of movement, whether it be

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movement properly so called, as the act of an imperfect thing, i.e., of a thing in potentiality, is called movement; or movement in a more general sense, as when said of the act of a perfect thing, as understanding and feeling are called movement. Accordingly all things are said to be alive that determine themselves to movement or operation of any kind.⁴⁴

We do it also in delineating the intellectual activity proper to man:

. . . in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly, whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive.⁴⁵

Even the activity of the contemplative life is *motus* in a sense:

. . . contemplation has indeed a rest from external motion; nevertheless the act of contemplating itself is a certain motion of the intellect in the sense that any operation is called motion, in the way in which the Philosopher says that sensing and

⁴⁴"Ex quo patet quod illa proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam speciem motus movent; sive accipiat motus proprie, sicut motus dicitur actus imperfecti, id est existentis in potentia, sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout etiam actus perfecti, prout intelligere et sentire dicuntur moveri, ut dicitur; ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel operationem aliquam" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 1).

⁴⁵". . . dicitur aliquis pati communiter ex hoc solo quod id quod est in potentia ad aliquid recipit illud ad quod erat in potentia, absque hoc quod aliquid abjiciatur; secundum quem motum omne quod exit de potentia in actum potest dici pati, etiam cum perficitur. Et sic intelligere nostrum est pati" (*ibid.*, q. 79, a. 2).

⁴⁶". . . contemplatio habet quidem quietem ab exterioribus motibus; nihilominus tamen ipsum contemplari est quidam motus intellectus, prout quaelibet operatio dicitur motus, secundum quod Philosophus dicit quod sentire et intelligere sunt motus qui-

dam, prout motus dicitur actus perfecti" (*ibid.*, II-II, q. 179, a. 1 ad 3).

⁴⁷"Si autem semper eam actu habeat [i.e., species intelligibilis], nihilominus per eam cognoscere potest, absque aliqua mutatione vel receptione praecedenti. Ex quo patet quod moveri ab objecto non est de ratione cognoscentis inquantum est cognoscens, sed in quantum est potentia cognoscens" (*ibid.*, I, q. 56, a. 1).

⁴⁸"Unde quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dicitur motus ejus ex hac similitudine, quod sicut motus est actus mobilis, ita hujusmodi actio est actus agentis; licet motus sit imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, hujusmodi autem actio sit actus perfecti, id est, existentis in actu. . . . Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est motus, id quod se intelligit dicitur se movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posuit quod Deus movet seipsum, non eo modo quo motus est actus imperfecti" (*ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3 ad 1).

understanding are a certain motion in the sense that motion is called the act of a perfect being.⁴⁶

Going still farther up the scale of perfection, where we find still greater independence of external principle of motion and less imperfection implied in the (analogical) motion itself, we find St. Thomas saying of an angel that if it

. . . always actually possesses [the intelligible species], it can nonetheless know through it without any preceding change or reception. From this it is evident that it is not of the nature of knower, as knowing, to be moved by the object, but as knowing in potentiality.⁴⁷

In the last sentence just quoted St. Thomas has really laid down the basic principle we need to see how God's intellectual activity is truly such without entailing any change or potency in God, but the series of steps is illuminating. And so, by removing the imperfection of creatures ("via negationis") he arrives at a legitimate application of the definition of life to God:

Hence, because movement [i.e., transient activity] is an act of the thing moved, the latter action [i.e., immanent activity], in so far as it is the act of the operator, is called its movement, by this similitude, that as movement is an act of the thing moved, so an act of this kind is the act of the agent, although movement is an act of the imperfect, that is, of what is in potentiality; while this kind of act is an act of the perfect, that is to say, of what is in act. In the sense, therefore, in which understanding is movement, that which understands itself is said to move itself. It is in this sense that Plato also taught that God moves Himself; not in the sense in which movement is an act of the imperfect.⁴⁸

Moreover life is to be said of God in the very highest and most perfect sense of the term ("via eminentiae"):

Wherefore that being whose act or understanding is its very nature, and who, in what it naturally possesses, is not determined by another, must have life in the most perfect degree. Such is God; and hence in Him principally is life. And so the Philos-

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opher (*Metaph.* xii. 51), having shown that God is intelligent, concludes that God has life most perfect and eternal, since His intellect is most perfect and always in act.⁴⁹

V

There is some reason to hope that an investigation of the various grades of living beings might throw some additional light on the hierarchical application of the concept of vital activity, as well as on the degree to which immanence can be said to constitute a perfection of life.

First, as to the notion of life developed from Aristotle and Aquinas in this study, it is obvious that the hierarchy must be in terms of various degrees of self-activation. This really involves two things: independence of the influence of other agents ("non determinatur ab alio," said St. Thomas in the last passage cited) and the possession of more actuality within oneself. These characteristics are easily seen to increase as we ascend the Dionysian scale of being. The lowly element, whether Aristotelian or modern, is utterly dependent upon the actions of those outside itself. Whatever motion it has it received from its Maker or from something else. It cannot perfect itself; indeed, it cannot act upon another without losing some of its perfection if not its very identity in chemical composition. It possesses little enough of reality and has no means of acquiring more. Plants, on the contrary, have the ability to acquire the matter of other things without loss of their own form but rather to their increase and prosperity. The plant acts upon other things, changing them and possessing them in a material way while perfecting itself, and thus asserts a certain independence of, and domination over, other portions of reality. In animal life we find a still higher degree of these same perfections, as is obvious. Animals can initiate their own local motion and determine the form, if not the end, of their activity.⁵⁰ Not only are they more

⁴⁹"Illud igitur, cujus sua natura est ipsum ejus intelligere, et cui id quod naturaliter habet non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum vitae. Tale autem est Deus. Unde in Deo maxime est vita. Unde Philosophus, ostenso quod Deus sit intelligens, concludit quod habeat vitam perfectissimam et sempiternam, quia intel-

lectus ejus est perfectissimus et semper in actu" (*ibid.*).

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, q. 18, a. 3.

⁵¹*Ibid.*, I, q. 84, a. 2.

⁵²"Unumquodque tendens in suam perfectionem, tendit in Divinam similitudinem," St. Thomas often says, and this is the theme of the whole of Chap. 21 of *Contra Gentiles*, III.

⁵³ST, I, q. 78, a. 1.

independent in their activity; but they can, in the language familiar to all students of St. Thomas, possess more of reality within themselves than the plants because they can not merely ingest the matter of other beings as the plants can but can possess them in a quasi-immaterial way; namely, through sense cognition by which they possess the forms of other things without their matter, though along with the conditions of matter.⁵¹ But as we find creatures more perfect, we find them more Godlike.⁵² Hence man, the most perfect in the visible world, imitates the divine nature in being able to possess (*intentionaliter*) all things—that is, all of reality—by his intellect and to assert by his free choices an independence of others, not only as to execution and form of his activities, like the brute, but also as to their end. Angels are, of course, still more independent of the limitations of the material universe and possessed of a greater portion of reality in fact. Lastly, God is both absolutely independent of all external principles of movement and at the same time fully possessed of all the perfections of reality.

But we can discern, in addition to these, other finer distinctions in the beings of these various levels, according to the principle of continuity already quoted from Pseudo-Dionysius that “*infinum superioris attingitur a supremo inferioris.*” We have seen that whereas God can operate on things outside Himself without change or loss, the element cannot; He receives no motion from outside Himself; the atom must receive all its motion. But within these two extremes are many degrees of receptivity and independence besides those mentioned in the preceding paragraph, which stand out in everyone’s thinking because of early gymnastics on the Porphyrean tree.

Thus, for instance, among things devoid of cognition there is a certain variety of degrees of receptivity of forms. We saw that the plant can be distinguished from the nonliving substance by its ability to receive another substance without losing its own form, although what is received does lose its form. But whereas in chemical composition both elements lose their form, even there the received forms are in the compound *virtute*, and thus the compound possesses something more of formal being than the element. Again, among the brutes, some, like the shellfish,⁵³ possess no locomotion; others are able by their own activity to free themselves from their material surroundings and move about. Likewise, some animals, like the oyster, are blessed only with

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the sense of touch, most material of all sensory cognitive powers; others have touch and smell, and so on up the scale to those blessed with vision, which has the widest range of receptivity of other beings' forms. Moreover, this distinction of the varying grades of sense cognition also illustrates another of our criteria; namely, that whereas in touch there is the greatest dependence on the activity of the stimulus and the most change in the recipient, in vision the independence of matter and exalted nature of the change leads St. Thomas to call the process "spiritual" immutation.⁵⁴ And in the realm of intellectual beings, we find not only the stereotyped division between angels and men but within the latter a variety ranging from those unfortunates whose intellectual processes barely surpass the more subtle material manipulations of the internal senses of a higher brute up to those minds whose intuitive soarings merit such titles as *Angelic Doctor*. Lastly, from faith we can add one further refinement to the graded hierarchy; namely, the tremendous possession of Being Itself granted us in the beatific vision.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, a. 3.

Science Institute, which was inaugurated at St. John's a year ago and which is fully integrated with the regular curriculum, has a four-fold objective: "to provide philosophers with a frame of reference for evaluating the methods and results of modern science; to provide natural scientists with a philosophical perspective for evaluating their own methods and results; to show the unity of man's knowledge of nature and to cultivate scholars who are philosophers and scientists at the same time; and finally to relate man's knowledge of nature to metaphysics and thus to prepare the way for the incorporation of natural science into the synthesis of sacred theology."

PROFESSOR JACQUES MARITAIN delivered a series of three lectures last November at Hunter College. The subject of the lectures was "Auguste Comte and the Religion of Humanity."

LAST SEPTEMBER the editorial staff of the Thomist Press initiated, as a complimentary service, a circular of timely topics entitled, "Current Quodlibetales." Its purpose is to discuss, more personally and informally than can be done in a review, current trends, needs, and areas of development in philosophy and theology. Future circulars will contain such items as notes on articles, books, lectures, and so on, which might stimulate further research; notes on latest meetings of philosophical and theological associations; and a letter forum for individuals to express their ideas and suggestions. Among others, the circular will be sent to all members of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and the Metaphysical Society of America.

THE DOMINICAN EDUCATIONAL ASSOCIATION was formed on April 2, 1959. Reverend Augustine Rock, O.P., was the initiator of the movement. The 1960 meeting of the Association will be held in conjunction with the National Catholic Educational Association sessions in Chicago. "The general purpose of the Dominican Educational Association would be to provide a channel for the promotion of educational principles and practices for Dominican educators."

THE ASSOCIATION FOR REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY held its fall meeting at the University of Connecticut last October. Professor John Wild read a paper on "Realism and the Problem of Human Freedom." Francis Parker delivered a paper on "Realism and Falsity," and Richard Robin on "C. S. Peirce and Some Medieval Forerunners."

THE MISSOURI STATE PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION held its twelfth annual meeting on October 16 and 17, 1959, at Rockhurst College, Kansas City. On the first day, independent papers were read by Professor Eugene Conover, of Lindenwood College, on "The Problem of Truth in Religion"; by Professor A. William Levi, of Washington University, on "Philosophy of Literature"; and by Professor W. Donald Oliver, of the University of Missouri, on "Presuppositions of Systems." On the second day a symposium was held on "The Philosophy of Science." Its panelists were: A. C. Benjamin, University of Missouri; Peter Caws, Kansas University; Alden L. Fisher, Saint Louis University; and Solomon E. Levy, University of Kansas City. The presidential address was delivered by Dr. Leonard Eslick, of Saint Louis University. Dr. Eslick delineated two antithetical concepts of freedom as suggested by Isaiah Berlin and then traced some minimal metaphysical conditions for personal freedom. Eugene Conover was elected president for the coming year, and James Reagan, of Saint Louis University, was re-elected secretary-treasurer.

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***L'Être et l'esprit.* By André Marc, S.J. Paris-Louvain: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1958. Pp. 197. Fr. b. 132.**

Father Marc is well known among contemporary Thomists for his remarkable series of volumes, *Psychologie réflexive* (2 vols.), *Dialectique de l'affirmation*, and *Dialectique de l'agir*, one of the outstanding examples of personal reconstruction of basic Thomistic philosophy in our time. In them he has consistently applied his method of "reflexive analysis" to construct a tightly knit system of philosophical psychology, metaphysics, and general ethics, inspired fundamentally by St. Thomas but integrating many positive contributions of method and content from modern philosophy (especially from Kant on to the modern French *philosophie de l'esprit*). The characteristic of his method is that it begins with a rich concrete experience involving and manifesting the human subject as profoundly as possible, then subjects this experience first to a careful phenomenological description to disengage its essential traits, and finally to reflexive analysis in depth through a dialectic of antithetical notions implied in the original experience. The latter phase is metaphysical analysis proper, whose goal is to uncover the ultimate metaphysical foundations or necessary conditions of intelligibility of the experience itself.

After the completion of this massive work, the fruit of a lifetime of reteaching and reflection, the author now steps back in the present comparatively brief concluding volume to take a kind of airplane survey of the whole sweep of his thought and draw out with greater explicitness the most significant conclusions resulting from it. To achieve this he focuses his full attention on the analysis of the two great central notions that dominate all philosophy and his own thought in particular; namely, mind and being in their mutual relationships.

In a rapid but clear condensation of his previous more detailed analyses, he takes off from the basic human act of communication through word or gesture and shows how this act is a synthesis of interiority and exteriority, spirit and matter, achieved by the unifying light of spiritual self-consciousness, which transcends in itself the multiplicity and dispersion of space and time. The opposition of subject and object is now transcended in turn by the discovery of the all-embracing unity of being itself, within which subject and object appear as two complementary poles. The reflexive

analysis next moves in quick strides through the basic moments of metaphysics up to God, the source of all being and hence the ultimate synthesis of subject and object, intellect and being. The author takes pains to show how mind and being are correlative at every step, and how the objective intelligible unity imbedded in the concrete order of being is brought to self-conscious spiritual ratification and fulfillment by the free communion of all persons in their common witness to being and its meaning. A chapter follows on the fruitfulness of these ideas for a fuller understanding of the meaning of sickness, death, and Christ as incarnate Word of God.

Along the way the author takes time out in a couple of chapters to sketch in broad strokes the development of the contrary movement of thought which stresses the conflict rather than the harmony between mind and being, and ends up in the two closely related extremes of idealism and empiricism. Here again, as throughout all his work, it is evident that the principal foil and stimulus to Father Marc's own thought have been the great dialectical idealists of the post-Kantian period rather than contemporary existentialist currents, which receive only passing attention.

It is difficult to evaluate or appreciate a work of synthesis and condensation of this kind apart from the four volumes which precede and support it, since certain of the metaphysical analyses and the criticisms of other philosophers are too summarily outlined here to be fully satisfying by themselves. But the central message of the irreducibly correlative character of mind and being, together with the necessary role of a community of persons within being in order to fulfill the full meaning and finality of being itself, emerges clearly and eloquently. A rich little book but not an easy one, since its thought moves consistently on the austere heights of an interiorized metaphysical reflection not too frequently practiced on this side of the water.

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Epistemology. By L. M. Régis, O.P. Trans. I. C. Byrne. New York: Macmillan Co., 1959. Pp. xii + 549. \$6.50.

Father Régis's previous work in the field of epistemology—notably his study of opinion in Aristotle and his Aquinas lecture in 1946—gave promise that this latest in the "Christian Wisdom Series" would be no ordinary textbook in epistemology. And indeed it is not. While intended for undergraduate students, it is primarily a long, interpretative commentary on the epistemological texts and thought of St. Thomas Aquinas regarding philosophical knowledge. The structure of the book, though unusual, is

clear; and frequent prologues, summaries, and conclusions allow one to locate himself easily as he works through the four parts and 476 pages of the text. Part I poses the Thomistic epistemological problem; Parts II, III, and IV examine Aquinas's answer to that problem in terms of the nature, the truth, and the infallibility of human knowledge.

Since the epistemological problem is only one particular problem, Father Régis prefaces his epistemological considerations with an account of the genesis and nature of a philosophical problem in general. Arising from contradictory accounts of the same data, a problem gives rise to the emotion of wonder that is the principle of the process of inquiry. The inquiry will first attempt a harmonious compromise between the conflicting accounts. If conciliation is impossible, the duality will be overcome by suppressing one of the two divergent accounts; if this fails, doubt is the dead-end of discovery, which, by turning permanently on the inability of the intellect to discover truth, hardens into skepticism.

Against this background of problem, wonder, and inquiry, Father Régis takes up in turn the modern epistemological problem in its classical formulations by Descartes and Kant, in its contemporary phase of the new learning in quantum and relativity theory, and in the Neo-Scholastic epistemologies of Noël and Maréchal. All of these are found wanting, and Father Régis returns to Aquinas.

The problem that Aquinas faced arose from the conflict between the Augustinian and Aristotelian views of the universe. Their root difference was not due to the presence or absence of faith in a Christian revelation but to a difference in methods. While the Platonism of St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure proceeds from the intelligible to the sensible, Aristotle starts from the sensible to reach the intelligible. Aquinas clearly chose the Aristotelian method but felt full freedom regarding the contents of Platonism and Aristotelianism. This Aristotelian method consisted not only in plotting the general movement from the sensible to the intelligible but also in lining up the series of successive questions relevant to scientific or philosophic knowledge: *An est? quid est? quia ita est? propter quid est?*

The application to knowledge of this series of ordered questions provides the framework for a Thomistic epistemology. The existence of knowledge is the immediately evident starting point that gives rise to the questions, What is knowledge? what are its properties? why does knowledge have these properties? Descartes and Kant, in violating the order of these questions, began by identifying knowledge with truth and truth with certitude. The inevitable procedure in a Thomistic epistemology must be from man to knowledge, to truth, to certainty or probability.

The 150 pages of Part II analyze the nature of knowledge in a detail that

is usually reserved for the treatment of knowledge in a philosophy of man. By contrasting the vital activity of knowledge with physical movement, Father Régis discusses the immanence, perfection, and self-construction of knowledge as grounded in the immaterial soul of man as in an ultimate principle. But if the soul explains the unity in human knowledge, it is the powers as proximate principles that account for the diversity of these immanent activities. Not only are the operations immanent to the powers, which are immanent to one another and to the soul that is their principle and end, but the operations themselves are immanent to one another in the synthesis that is an act of knowledge.

Knowledge, however, is not merely an operation immanent to a knowing subject; it is also essentially a knowledge of an object. The notion of object as the thing in its relationship to the soul is central to Thomistic epistemology. In human knowledge this fundamental relationship is causal. As the sensible is the cause of sensation, the intelligible is the cause of intellection. All the powers are active in the order of exercise; in the order of specification, they are either active or passive, depending on whether their correlative objects are passive or active. The sense powers are passive only in the order of formal causality; they must receive a specific determination from the object. The physical action of the object on the body by means of qualitative and local movement is only the condition of sensory knowledge; the intentional action is the cause. This latter activity of "spiritual immutation" is in the line of exemplary causality, according to the relation of measure to measured. The effect of this quasi-exemplary causality of the sensible existent is the sensible species, which is an image or specific likeness of the thing and caused by the thing.

The transition from sensation to intellection occurs through the activity of the agent intellect. Its causality is described as an abstraction and illumination that results in the intelligible species. Father Régis adopts the theory of John of St. Thomas in explaining the interlocking causalities of the agent intellect and phantasm: the agent intellect is the sole efficient cause of the intelligible species; the phantasm exercises the objective causality of measure to measured. The resultant intelligible species is consequently composed of a formal element which is the actual intelligibility, due to the efficient causality of the agent intellect, and a material element that is defined by its likeness to the phantasms from which it is drawn.

But how can an activity that is entirely immanent terminate in an external thing? The solution lies in the distinction between exercise and specification. The immanence of knowledge is explained through the fact that the subject exercises the act of knowledge; the objective exteriority of knowledge through the fact that the object specifies the act. From the side of the exercise of knowledge, the knower is both the cause and the perfected

term of knowledge; from the side of the specification of knowledge, the external thing is the cause and term of knowledge. With the advance in immanence from the external senses through the internal senses to the intellect, there is a parallel growth in the objective grasp of external reality. After a lengthy analysis of the various stages in external and internal sense knowledge, Father Régis outlines the moments in the intellect's deepening penetration of the real. First, there is the indistinct knowledge of *quod est*, physical being in its actual becoming. A second moment seeks a knowledge of the nature of the *quod est*; this is to know being as quiddity or *res*. The third stage of intellectual penetration reveals external things as unified wholes of substance and accidents. A still further specification of human knowledge brings the intellect to the stage of distinguishing the act of existence by which a being is from the initial act of motion or the acts of substantial and accidental forms. In grasping the act of existence as the act of being, one also considers each thing in its existential unity with other things, thereby forming a distinctive totality expressed by the concept of being as being. As the *quod* of the *quod est* gradually becomes more determinate in our knowledge, the meaning of *est* becomes more indeterminate. But this indetermination of being is not due to imperfection in the content of knowledge as in the knowledge of a genus or an individual but to the medium of knowledge. The apprehension of being as being constitutes man's most universal and perfect knowledge, and is the path to God, who is being by essence.

The analysis of the nature of knowledge leads into the question of the truth of knowledge in Part III. Up to this point, there has been no discussion of judgment. Even in speaking of man's knowledge of being as being, Father Régis used the language of apprehension. The purpose of judgment is not to grasp an aspect of reality, either quiddity or existence, that apprehension fails to grasp, but to bring unity into the concepts of apprehension. Under the drive of the intellect's natural appetite for being and the perfect possession of being, the judgment regroups and correlates the noun-concepts and verb-concepts of apprehension to form one synthetic intelligibility. The direct object of the act of judgment is not the extramental real but our knowledge of the real, the composition of concepts that were previously apprehended. Three proofs are offered to substantiate this position: judgments of identity do not focus on real existence; secondly, the natural act of existence of a being is substantial, while the *is* of judgment is an accidental predicate; lastly, judgments that have God as their object obviously cannot touch the actual existence of God but only the truth of the proposition that God exists. The immanent term of judgment is the enunciation with its quantitative and qualitative properties. The enunciation is a likeness of what Aquinas calls the *ipsum esse rei*,

which Father Régis holds is not the act of existence alone but the existential mode of the real in its totality as essence and existence, substance and accidents. Such is the measuring object of the enunciation. The constructed unity in the enunciation allows it to agree or disagree with the unified complexity of the thing's mode of existence. An agreement is truth; a disagreement is falsity. Truth is, therefore, a characteristic of the enunciation considered as the immanent term of the judgment, expressive of and measured by the complex unity of the thing. The intellect knows the truth by reflecting upon itself and its immanent operation of judgment. The starting point of this reflection is the enunciation that terminates judgment. Following the outline of the moments of reflection as set down by Aquinas in *De Veritate*, q. 1, a. 9, Father Régis insists that this reflection cannot stop with the grasp of the intellect's nature and passivity in the face of the real but must continue until one understands the actual dependence of concepts on phantasms. Among the various truths of knowledge, there is a hierarchy determined by the different complex unities that measure the constructed unities of the enunciation.

Part IV deals with the immediate and mediate truths that the intellect knows infallibly. There are four groups of universal, immediately evident judgments: the principle of noncontradiction, of identity, of causality, of finality. Each of these first principles is analyzed in its ontological and epistemological aspects. The act by which the intellect judges the value of these truths and their hierarchized relations to one another is the act of *assent*. The object of assent is truth as infallibly possessed by the intellect. Thus assent is not identified with the act of judgment. Assent proceeds from a reflection upon a direct judgment of the intellect and registers in a reflex and modal judgment the approval of the truths already known. This results in certitude as a repose of the intellect in its possession of infallible truth. The "kinds" of certitude are the absolute intellectual certitude by which the intellect reposes in its infallible grasp of first principles; the scientific certitude in the grasp of a conclusion as proceeding from the truth of first principles; the certitude of faith that stems from a volitional determination; and lastly, the experiential certitude produced by sensible evidence that perdures only for the length of the sensation itself.

But the grasp of immediate principles is far from the whole of man's philosophical knowledge. Such principles are in the order of discovery the starting point for the reasoning process and in the order of judgment the point of resolutive return. The immanent exercise of reason in its passage from the known to the unknown is essentially intermediary between two judgments that it unifies or opposes. The field within which reason

operates is that of the real relations of cause and effect, means and end, concomitance and succession, and so on. It is this causal order that measures mediate truth, as the *ipsum esse rei* serves as the measure of immediate truth. If the necessary causal links cannot be known through processes of analysis and synthesis, then philosophical knowledge gives way to the techniques of modern science.

Such in impoverishing summary are the major topics treated in this ambitious work. And judgment on the book must look at it in two ways, as a study of the thought of Aquinas on the problems of philosophical knowledge and as an undergraduate textbook in epistemology.

Frankly, I am not certain about its teachability to American undergraduates. Certainly we are at a point where the class manuals in philosophy are no longer a catechism of correct answers to be memorized for apologetic purposes. But as an undergraduate manual, the book is at times extraordinarily full and detailed. However, this very fullness might increase its readability for an undergraduate. The book supposes a good working knowledge of metaphysics; that is fair enough. But the abstract, technical analyses could have been made more meaningful if they had been prefaced by a phenomenological and psychological description of knowledge as present in one's actual awareness. The book cannot stand as an independent investigation and reflection on knowledge; it is rather an instrument for finding out what St. Thomas thought about the nature and properties of philosophical knowledge. Furthermore, a continuous reading of the book (quite obviously a translation from the French) makes one aware of the annoying frequency of extended and mixed metaphors, untranslated Latin terms and phrases, long, crowded sentences, and unnecessary transient eulogies of St. Thomas.

If the book is regarded as an exploration of the epistemological thought of St. Thomas—and the importance of the book lies here—Father Régis is to be commended for cutting through many of the issues that have befogged Scholastic epistemologies in their unsuccessful attempts to accommodate themselves to the problems and terminology of non-Scholastic philosophers. The ground-clearing action of Part I leaves the Thomistic analysis in the remaining sections free from polemics. Our summary account of the contents indicates that several topics usually treated in a course in epistemology do not appear: the nature of evidence, the "problem" of universals, the type of induction, and so on. The unfortunate division of certitude into metaphysical, physical, and moral is happily absent. Several of the interpretations and positions taken by the author are debatable; Father Régis clearly recognizes this. Further discussion has not been closed on such points as the causalities of the object, senses, and intellect in the acts of sensation and understanding; the causalities

of the agent intellect and phantasm in the production of the intelligible species; the function and object of the act of judgment; the role of reflection in judgment; the relation between judgment and assent; the process of reaching a knowledge of being as being (especially the role of negative judgments of separation—an omission particularly surprising in the light of some of Father Régis's earlier writings). One misses most, perhaps, an examination of the philosophical problem of nonphilosophical types of human knowledge, especially of scientific knowledge in the modern sense of the term "science." The fact that this cannot be derived from an analysis of the texts of Aquinas should not exclude it from a present-day epistemology that in any way pretends to be complete. The question of the nature of scientific knowledge (and its relations to prephilosophical and philosophical knowledge) is, in fact, the key issue in contemporary epistemology.

But Father Régis has clearly limited his study to an examination of the epistemological thought of St. Thomas. In this area, Father Régis has put us all in his debt by this first-rate study by a first-rate scholar.

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An Introduction to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus.' By G. E. M. Anscombe.
London: Hutchison Univ. Lib., 1959. University Library, Philosophy Series. Pp. 179.

Something rather similar to Aristotle's distinction between things more intelligible in their own right and things more familiar to us might well be applied to books. At bottom, the great original texts—the *Republic*, the first *Critique*, *Process and Reality*, and perhaps we may count here the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* too—are more knowable than are the hosts of introductions, exegeses, and criticisms written after them. But without the latter, those others would remain obscure through their very newness, scope, incisiveness, and power. Miss Anscombe's book does not pretend to be a new vision of philosophic problems—or a new cure for headaches—but it sticks so closely to Wittgenstein's text that if his text contains truths, then her book must also. Miss Anscombe talks about a philosophy that talks about the problems of logic and language, but in a way more familiar, more persuasive, than the model she has chosen to interpret. Her close study of the *Tractatus* has afforded her solutions to some of its difficulties, though she has refrained from raising many of the larger questions about its exciting approach. Be that as it may, important work in philosophy is frequently done at one remove from the things or symbols which directly furnish the problems; and Miss Anscombe's book has in this second way enunciated valuable propositions about the world.

Oddly enough, most of the more thorough expositions of the *Tractatus* have been written by Americans or Italians, not Britishers, though this is doubtless a coincidence, with no essential causes. Alexander Maslow's dissertation (still unpublished), Julius Weinberg's *An Examination of Logical Positivism*, and James K. Feibleman's reflections, *Inside the Great Mirror*, are demonstrably not written in any British tradition of philosophizing; and although they are based only upon study of Wittgenstein's published text, each contains insights of real worth. Miss Anscombe's book is of a different order not only because she has had access to much ancillary material up to now hidden but also because she has been associated with a "school," so that her understanding is based neither upon happy chance nor upon remote deductions but upon breathing a philosophic atmosphere created largely by the heady effluvia of Wittgenstein's own work, early and late. Had Wittgenstein never existed, some historian would certainly be finding it necessary to invent him, so similar have been the problems and doctrines of writers in Britain during the last thirty years.

The criticism already heard in certain quarters, that Miss Anscombe's book is much too difficult for inclusion in a home university series, is a little beside the point, for the *Introduction* has its own virtues, regardless of its neighbors in a library. It is meant to be read as a companion to the *Tractatus*; and that is a work which, like so many others, can be read first or fiftieth but is so different from the rest that it will remain obscure unless the reader "does philosophy" with a little of the boldness of its tortured and quite incredible author.

The principal trouble with previous commentators and critics has been that they have started by saying that the *Tractatus* is profound, oracular, and difficult, and then have taken the most obvious lines of interpretation of points for which they feel a sympathy. Russell, Urmson, and Popper have made out the lessons of the *Tractatus* to be so plain that one wonders why the book should ever have been considered subtle, indeed anything but a primer of some hackneyed dogma. Ramsey was the first, and Miss Anscombe is the best, in the attempt to unify the philosophy of the *Tractatus* with the logic. Feibleman, whose book is otherwise helpful, shrugs off passage after passage dealing with what he calls "notation"; but just here Miss Anscombe plunges bravely in, rightly convinced, I believe, that Wittgenstein's purpose is not only to frame a general theory of language but also to make the best possible use of existing and new symbols to insure that a given language, with the help of these clarified symbols, would be exactly adequate. I would go on to say that accomplishment of his purpose involved a very careful identification of language with the world, in certain respects, and just as careful a separation of it, in others. Whether Miss Anscombe would wish to say just this I hesitate to opine,

though there is nothing in her *Introduction* definitely precluding that view. At any rate, she tackles one "theme" in the *Tractatus* after another, not relinquishing any until her interpretation has been made to yield a good measure of plausibility. It is a pity that a short review cannot take up more than a handful of the twenty or so topics that she expounds so earnestly.

Now to business. Miss Anscombe expends much labor on the picture theory of language, which Wittgenstein thought of as resting on an essential likeness of the elements of a proposition (its names) to the structure of an integrated set of facts (*Introd.*, p. 100; *Tract.*, 2.1, 2.161, 4.04, and so on). If the world's facts do not hang together, then speaking about them and mirroring them in signs would be impossible. If they do hang together, then their structure is shared by propositions; but the coherence and the existence of facts are two different things; hence from the structure of a proposition which carries its own sense (that is, is not derived from some other proposition) you cannot immediately decide whether that proposition is true or false (*Tract.*, 2.225). The structure shared by fact and proposition is partly spatial, partly not. Miss Anscombe is able to show how Wittgenstein moves little by little from physical space to logical space in his conception (*Introd.*, pp. 70-74; *Tract.*, 2.182) and still keeps the physical space fundamental by his insistence upon models (*ibid.*, p. 100; *Tract.*, 3.143).

The ideal imaging proposition is one no part of which mirrors anything but a factual structure among simple things; and this is called by Wittgenstein an elementary proposition (*Tract.*, 4.21) both because it is first and all others are built with its help, and also because in essence it is easiest to grasp—impossible, indeed, not to grasp. The only trouble is that in the *Tractatus* there is no list, no description, no samples of elementary propositions; and even those who, like Russell, knew Wittgenstein in the years when the book was taking shape, were quite baffled. All Miss Anscombe says here is

And "Red patch here" would seem to be a candidate for being a simple or elementary observation statement. . . . This suggests that the elementary propositions are not merely observation statements, but sense-datum statements; as, indeed, they were taken to be both by many members of the Vienna Circle [this is one of the few places where she makes any concession to that group!] and for many years in Cambridge discussions. And I think it is quite possible that Wittgenstein had roughly this sort of thing rather vaguely in mind (*Introd.*, pp. 26-27).

I count five hesitations in the last sentence. The question appears to be open to much more discussion, including some on the point whether all ele-

mentary propositions have to be of the same kind, varying only in the individual names fitted into them. Certainly this is not generated by Wittgenstein's desire to achieve Heracleitean obscurity but rather by his awareness that when we try to clarify propositions and purge them of all unclear materials, so that they attach immediately to the world, we find that our successes are very few. So said Plato, so Aristotle, so Spinoza; and it is quite futile to believe with Russell that "Socrates is wise" is elementary *just* because it contains no logical connectives. Otherwise the proposition p , which can be simply marked with the truth-values T or F, could be distinguished once and for all from the peculiar compounded proposition p, q , TFTF (p , and q or not-- q), simply in respect to connectives. It is not that easy, because these two propositions "carry the same information, yet one is loaded with logical constants, the other not."

Miss Anscombe's account of truth-functions is unusually careful in hitching this conception of Wittgenstein's to cognate ones in mathematicians and especially to Frege, but it contains little that is out of the ordinary; so I pass on to her discussion of Wittgenstein's general form of proposition, a doctrine of which, to judge by the remarks with which he frames it round, he was highly proud. He did not, of course, make the error of assuming that the total number of elementary propositions was finite; but he did treat the problem as if we could tell offhand by using a formula just what any term in a series of compound propositions would be, were we to start, say, with just two elementary propositions (*Tract.*, 6., 6.001 ff.). What Miss Anscombe shows, contrary to Russell's explanation, is that Wittgenstein's well-known formula $[\bar{p}, \bar{\xi}, N(\bar{\xi})]$ is not something to be applied mechanically to propositions strung out in a row, as we might say that $2 + 1 = 3$, $3 + 1 = 4$, and so on, but rather that it requires careful scanning of the results of each successive operation to determine just what elements are to be selected for the next.

Only in a secondary way is Miss Anscombe's a revolutionary book, because it should at last effectively put a stop to much nonsense about Wittgenstein's alleged theory of verification and to some of the mistakes that have arisen from neglecting the very sharp distinctions (such as that between *sinnlos* and *unsinnig*) which one finds, by using a little care, in the *Tractatus*. Ogden's translation was good only in a very general way; it got the book before a much wider public. But in place after place Miss Anscombe has gone about the task of improving upon it. My complaint about *her* book is one which grows out of its virtues. She stands very close to the *Tractatus* and to the succeeding documents and publications; and although she makes clear her dissent from a number of doctrines, one feels that her companion-book is so like the original in its principal viewpoints and selection of problems that the oppositions are not stark

enough to reveal the deepest structure of the text. To reveal this, one would have to step back from the *Tractatus*, being careful not to lose contact with it altogether, and attempt to see it whole, perhaps by turning its formulations on different sides. But whoever was not greatly helped by *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'* could never be that perceptive new commentator.

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***Determinism and Freedom.* Ed. Sidney Hook. New York: New York Univ. Press. Pp. 237. \$5.00.**

This book consists of a series of papers delivered at the New York University Institute of Philosophy, with criticism and comment appended in the fourth part. The contents divide into four parts: first, "Determinism in Philosophy"; second, "Determinism in Modern Science"; third, "Determinism and Responsibility in Law and Ethics"; fourth, "Discussion."

Many factors are at work converging upon a great and widespread interest in the subject matter here considered. Foremost among these one might list the notion of indeterminacy, emanating from quantum mechanics, and the tendency among some segments of psychoanalytic thought to consider all human activity as causally derived from subliminal and prenatal stimuli, along with hereditary characteristics. Determinists are by nature "reductionist" in outlook; it is clear why they should be deeply troubled by antideterministic developments at the very heart of matter. It is no less clear why their bosom friends, the rationalists, are set back a pace by Heisenberg's principle and its corollary, Bohr's principle of complementarity, both of which are direct blows at the all-embracing self-sufficiency of human mental ability.

In the twenty-five-odd contributions, several—perhaps eight or ten—are outstanding. There is hardly place here to list them all. But a further reason favoring silence is the hope that everyone who even glances at this review will be led to the book itself. And, let us emphasize, the book is not one to be glanced at. It must be read several times, and this with pencil in hand; and this holds even for the third part, which is surely the least satisfactory and the most inconclusive, though by no means of minor importance.

The most important issue of the volume is twofold: What effect does the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle have upon philosophical determinism? What effect does this all have upon the facts and theories of human freedom? During the development of the argument the point mentioned at the beginning stands out in bold relief. The theories of

modern physics are so closely tied up with epistemological presuppositions, perhaps so dependent upon them, that it becomes increasingly difficult to say where the one ends and the other begins. And, in like vein, it is becoming harder to tell where and when the "distorting" effect of the knowing subject contacts the pure primary data of sense. We are, of course, convinced that Kant ultimately was wrong and that positivism is self-destructive. We are also convinced that a thorough analysis of the facts and the arguments in *Determinism and Freedom* must enter deeply into the structure of an epistemology which is to live in the twentieth century, not in the thirteenth.

The volume is timely. It is important for what it says, even more important for what it sometimes leaves unsaid. We sense in the background that vague imponderable, the *Zeitgeist*; we feel that the temper of the times is changing rapidly, that human thought is at one of the great crises of its development. The forces of disunion are on the wane; the attempts to patch up the segmented mess that man has made of human thought are in the ascendancy.

Of course, it seems to us that not all of the book is up to high caliber. Under the circumstances this would be almost impossible. There are intermittent forays which we cannot classify as this or that. There are still, much too often, the attempts to semanticize, to play with words as the child plays with his blocks. There are at times those logical vagaries to which the mind of man is prone: hidden assumptions, slightly circular reasonings, conclusions which jump a little wide of their premises, and the like. Fortunately most of these defects are brought out into the open in the discussion section at the end of the volume.

What else does the volume bring to mind? The very great difficulties which go along with that particular type of interpersonal relation known as the art of communication. In the first place, there is at times definite evidence that one of the writers has failed to give a clear account of his meaning—a fact mentioned several times in the various criticisms. In such circumstances the reader must do the best he can to extract the most probable meaning, and there are usually sufficient adjuncts to make this rather simple. But supposing the difficulties in communication lie not with the writer but with the potential reader who has a philosophic predisposition in some direction or other? What is to be done then? Finally, suppose that a philosopher who is sufficiently competent, interested, and objective to assimilate the fundamental notions of the book into his own mental structure of perennial truths finds his own thought-content much enriched and finds much that he can contribute to the development of the issues at stake—what can he do to gear his own mode of communication to the situation and needs of his potential auditors?

NOTES ON FOREIGN BOOKS

Acte et être. By Michele-F. Sciacca. Trans. Francis Authier. Paris: Aubier, 1958. Pp. 226. Paper.

Though in the view of its author this volume is only a part of his "philosophy of integrality," it is an important one. From some points of view, it is the easiest place to discover some of the author's distinctive positions. Sciacca is one of the leaders of what is known as "Christian spiritualism" in Italy; and this movement has many similarities to the French "philosophies of spirit," "of the person," "of subjectivity." In this present work, Sciacca distinguishes clearly between being, act, the real, and existence. To him, the identification of reality and existence, and of being and reality is "a vulgar prejudice" (p. 104); the Idea and value are equally, if not more, important. The present work also takes up the notions of potency, essence, the dialectic, participation, form, the world, the nature of love. In an appendix (pp. 179-224), Sciacca distinguishes his view of "act" from that of "actualism," especially as the latter is explained by Gentile.

The translation seems adequate, and it will be of advantage to many students.

Approches phénoménologiques de l'idée d'être. By Stanislas Breton. Lyon: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 254. Paper, Fr. 2,100.

The author explains that this work is not a metaphysical study of being but an introduction; it should be added that it will serve as such only to readers who have some acquaintance with contemporary phenomenological terminology and technique. The author approaches his subject from three levels. At the level of perception, the author deals with the "world" which the phenomenologists have elaborated and considers it as horizon, as unity, and as the whole. In developing the distinction between the biological environment (*Umwelt*) and the world (*Welt*) the author points out the significance of the human *vis cogitativa* in contrast to the animal estimative. At the level of imagination, the subject is the idea of matter. He digresses briefly to point out the relation of metaphysics to the imagination and to suggest that different types of imagery may be correlated with different kinds of philosophies. He also suggests that the "four temperaments" of ancient physiology are related to the four elements of ancient

cosmology and that perhaps both have a kind of mythical validity. He discusses in particular the element of earth and the feeling of reality, and the element of air and the notion of transcendence. In this connection, also, he discusses the relation between a datum and form, between act and form, and the idea of being as a dynamic scheme. Next he considers the idea of being in itself, as an idea. He begins by insisting that the idea of being is not a concept or a representation. In particular, it is not a thing but rather a condition of the possibility of things. He considers the idea of being as formal object, as presence, as absolute horizon, as pure relation.

The task which the author has attempted here is indeed a very important one. And it is also true that bringing different philosophies together face to face cannot but correct and enrich them. But it is not clear that phenomenological approaches, in the sense in which they have been exploited by Husserl, Sartre, or Heidegger, can lead to a metaphysics of being. In other words, historical phenomenologies are not necessarily a pure phenomenology of experience; they are sometimes modified (distorted?) by prephilosophical decisions and unconscious prejudgments. True, the author does sometimes point out particular limitations of a given phenomenological analysis, but there seems room for further critical evaluation.

Arystotelesowska i Tomistyczna. Teoria Przyczyny Sprawczej na tle Pojęcia Bytu. By Marian Jaworski. Lublin: Katolickiego Uniw. Lubelskiego, 1958. Pp. 135. Paper, 25 zł.

This is a comparative study of Aristotle and St. Thomas. The author begins with a brief review of the meanings of substance, matter, and form in both philosophers, and spends a bit more time on the meaning of being, emphasizing St. Thomas's explicit recognition of the act of existing. Next he takes up the general doctrine of change and causality in both Aristotle and St. Thomas, and shows that from many points of view their analysis is the same. But when he takes up more detailed analyses, especially the functions of form and efficient cause, he shows that St. Thomas's explanation is influenced by his position on the act of existing. Finally, he takes up the doctrines of the First Mover, the notion of creation and of eternity, and the question of the infinity of the First Principle. Here, obviously, St. Thomas and Aristotle do differ, and the author shows how these differences cohere with the differing views of being and causality. In a brief conclusion, the author points out that St. Thomas was not a mere commentator but that he produced an original synthesis.

There is a bibliography of works consulted which naturally includes many Polish writings which are otherwise difficult to find out about.

***Aux sources de l'existentialisme chrétien: Kierkegaard.* By Régis Jolivet. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 1958. Pp. 287. Paper, 900 f.**

Though the publishers of this volume add the expression "nouvelle édition" on the title page, they do not mention of which work it is a new edition. On the outside and in their description of the work, it is described as if it were new; and, stranger still, in a list of the works "du même auteur," the original edition, *Introduction à Kierkegaard* (Saint-Wandrille: Fontenelle, 1946) is omitted. Monsignor Jolivet's *Kierkegaard* is widely known and considered to be among the better general studies; it has been translated into English long since. The "newness" of this new edition seems to consist in the omission of most of the footnotes and of a slight rearrangement of chapter headings. Though a new generation of students will be glad to be able to purchase this book, the present publisher's handling of it is reprehensible.

***Die Bedeutung des Seins bei den klassischen Kommentatoren des heiligen Thomas von Aquin: Capreolus, Silvester von Ferrara, Cajetan.* By Johannes Hegyi, S.J. "Pullacher philosophische Forschungen," Band IV. Pullach bei München: Verlag Berchmanskolleg, 1959. Pp. vii + 176. Paper.**

This is a richly documented historical and textual study. All the certainly known facts about the three Commentators are given at the beginning of the section dealing with their doctrine on being. In his study of Capreolus, he begins with the threefold meaning of *esse* (essence, act of essence or being, the true) and examines the distinction between essence and *esse*, as well as its relation to form. He concludes that, though Capreolus's terminology was influenced by his contemporaries, he is faithful to St. Thomas's thought. After this, he considers Capreolus's doctrine of personality, taking first the various interpretations given to this doctrine (the one with the best textual foundation being that *esse* is the formal element of suppositality); he concludes that *esse* in this case also means "the act of being or essence." (In the course of this treatment, he maintains that St. Thomas changed his meaning of *esse* from "mere existence" to "the fullness of actuality" [pp. 32-35].)

Next Francis Silvester of Ferrara is studied. The author first examines the texts dealing directly with *esse* to discover his explicit meaning and the relation of this to St. Thomas's thought. In another he examines

Silvester's use of being in the problems of essence and existence, existence and form, the nature of the person, and the analogy of being. (Silvester holds that analogy principally means proportionality but that the latter always implies proportion and rests on it.) The author concludes that Silvester is in many respects a faithful interpreter of St. Thomas but that in others he verges toward an essentialistic notion of being.

The doctrine of Cajetan is examined in much the same way—in the texts directly expressing the meaning of *esse* and in the use of *esse* in the discussion of being itself, analogy, and the constitution of the person. He finds that *esse* for Cajetan is "mere existence," as it were, almost "facticity"; that he interprets analogy as proportionality without basing it on proportion and so is primarily concerned with analogy in terms of essence; and finally that at least in his latest formulation of the problem he finds the formal element of personality to be not *esse* but a substantial mode. The author therefore concludes that though Cajetan upholds many basic theses of his master and in his direct statements often seems entirely faithful, in the basic insight into being and in some major points he has departed from St. Thomas.

There is a good bibliography, an index of names, and a rather brief index of subjects.

***La cité de Dieu.* By St. Augustine. French trans. G. Combès; general introd. and notes by G. Bardy. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1959. Vol. I, pp. 870.**

This volume is No. 33 in the complete edition of the works of St. Augustine and the first of five containing the *City of God*. The merit, convenience, and general excellence of this series have often been praised in the highest terms, and the present volume maintains the same high standards. The series, as is well known, presents the Latin text and the French translation on facing pages.

The present volume contains a general introduction to the entire work, (pp. 9-144) and a special introduction to Books I-V (pp. 175-85), with a general detailed and classified bibliography (pp. 145-63); these sections, together with the notes, for the most part (pp. 767-834), were written by G. Bardy three years before his death. These sections have been edited and completed by F.-J. Thonnard, A. C. de Veer, and G. Folliet; notes added by the editors are signed. In addition, tables of references to Sacred Scripture, to St. Augustine's other works, and to other authors quoted by him, and a detailed general index are provided.

The Latin text is that of the fourth Teubner edition, established by G. Dombart and A. Kalb; the principal variants of the edition by Migne

and of the *Corpus Christianorum* were collated and added by F.-J. Thonnard and M. A. Devynck.

Topics treated in the general introduction are: the occasion for writing the *City of God*, the steps of its composition, its plan, the origins of the notion of "city," the "two cities," the sources of St. Augustine, his language and style. The final section deals with the manuscripts, editions, and translations.

This edition is clearly one of the most valuable for all purposes.

***El Comienzo del Mundo.* By José M. Riaza, S.J. Madrid: La Editorial Católica, 1959. Pp. xxxvi + 703 (+ xx plates). 105 ptas.**

Father Riaza is a professor of natural sciences in the Pontifical University of Comillas and on the Faculty of Philosophy of Loyola, in Spain. This present work, just as the author's previous book, *Ciencia Moderna y Filosofía* (see THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, XXXIV [March, 1957], 204), is also planned primarily as a textbook, or rather a reading book, for the course of scientific questions required for the ecclesiastical degree in philosophy.

Without the laconic style of a manual, it provides a readable account of modern scientific findings in geology and astronomy. Topics like Carbon 14 dating, evolution of a star, expansion of the universe, and many others are presented accurately and in their historical setting and in a manner capable of being understood by educated people who lack specialized training in science. The large bibliography and good indices give the work value also as a reference book. [Gonzalo Madurga, s.j.]

***L'Esprit absorbant de l'enfant.* By Maria Montessori. Trans. Georgette J.-J. Bernard. Bruges: Desclée-de Brouwer, 1959. Pp. 244. Paper, 145 fr. b.**

The present volume is one of the more speculative writings of the noted Italian educator and educational theorist. The author emphasizes the self-guided development of the infant in his earliest years, contending that if the child is merely left to his natural instincts, he will acquire all the necessary skills. Yet there is a great deal of experience that is referred to, and there are some insights into human nature and the learning process which other psychologists could well pay attention to.

The translation is very good.

Ethica Generalis. By Joseph de Finance, S.J. Rome: Gregorian Univ. Press, 1959. Pp. 336. Paper.

This textbook of general ethics is divided into three parts: first, the nature, norm, and ontological foundation of moral value; second, the objective moral order (law and right) and the subjective moral order (specification of moral acts, conscience, and the moral life, especially the virtues); third, the relation between morality and happiness (tendency, sanction, and the nature of happiness).

The treatment throughout is generally detailed, and considerable notice is taken of differing theories and explanations. In presenting and discussing these various opinions there is a notable objectivity and calmness. The completeness of the coverage will make the work very desirable for teachers and advanced students.

Notable features include the excellent discussion of the nature of moral behavior considered in its full phenomenological uniqueness. Where Scholastic textbooks hastily accept the Aristotelian eudemonism or a simple teleology (and accept the reduction of obligation to hypothetical necessity, albeit in the *modus ponens*), Father de Finance takes the moral imperative as absolute. The moral imperative, he holds, is a necessity of practical reason. Distinctive also—but perhaps a less successful feature—is the almost complete replacement of the term “good” by the term “value.” Finally, traditional materials are used as well as the insights of some of the most recent philosophers, and this not merely in factual juxtaposition but in integrated harmony.

Etudes sur la valeur. Vol. II, Le règne des fins. By Jean Pucelle. Preface by Jean Nabert. Paris: Vitte, 1959. Pp. 460. Paper, 2,500 f.

By the term *fin* the author means a concrete end attained by action and leading in turn to further action as it has been achieved by prior means. By the term *valeur* he means a transcendental worth which confers goodness upon the concrete goods. He considers that the “kingdom of ends” is culture and civilization. He examines a multitude of data from anthropology, social psychology, child psychology, and philosophy of history. By means of a phenomenological analysis he tries to find the essence of civilization in its pure state (which turns out to be pretty similar to the nature of intentionality as the phenomenologists describe it) and to isolate “the act which creates civilization,” which is suspiciously like the act of cognition. It is an interesting and stimulating book.

***Evidenza dell'Uomo nel Lavoro.* By Fausto M. Bongioanni. Milan: Marzorati, 1958. Pp. 228. Paper, L. 1,800.**

This is more a sociological and psychological study of work than a philosophical one—as indeed most writing on “the philosophy of work” tends to be. The author begins with psychological and sociological remarks about “the human potential.” He deals with problems of management and organization, communication, personnel and placement problems, efficiency and justice, education and work, and the psychological relevance of a religious outlook. Though there are many references to American customs and writings, the author's point of view remains Continental.

***Le Fa Yen. Le catéchisme philosophique.* By Yang-Hiong-tsé. French trans. with introd, by Bruno Belpaire. Bruxelles: Editions de l'Occident, 1959. Pp. 113. Paper.**

The *Fa Yen* is believed to have been written between the years 1 and 6 A.D.; its author is one of the lesser lights among the ancient Chinese philosophers. The purpose of the author is to represent and make available to his disciples the moral ideas of Confucius, which he does by means of a question and answer method in ten books. Typically, there is no logical structure to the whole nor to the parts. Often enough, the answers are enigmatic comments, little stories, or rhetorical questions. “Clarity of teaching” is extolled by the writer, but the only thing he is clear on are the concrete moral precepts he wishes to inculcate. The reader looks in vain for the meaning of basic ideas like justice, virtue, faith.

The translation is relatively easy reading, given the rather incoherent original text. The introduction views the ideas of Yang-tsé from the point of view of systematic philosophy; the translator notes that there are a few vague cosmological, metaphysical, and psychological ideas, but no clearly perceptible systematic background. In treating of the ethical content, the introduction compares it to Christian morality and finds that certain basic notions (such as charity and belief in immortality) are altogether lacking, while the ideas that are taken up are handled entirely in this-worldly terms.

[To be continued.]

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